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TORT LIABILITY IN THE AGE OF THE HELICOPTER PARENT

Elizabeth G. Porter*
ABSTRACT
Discussions of parental liability by courts and legal scholars are often
tinged with fear: fear that government interference will chill parental
autonomy; fear that parents will be held liable fbr their children's every
misdeed; and, recently, fear that a new generation of so-called "helicopter
parents" who hover over their children's every move will establish
unrealisticallyhigh legal standardsfor parenting.However, in the context
of common law suits against parents, these fears are misguided. To the
contrary, courts have consistently shielded wealthierparents-those most
likely to be defendants in civil suits-from exposure to liabilityfor conduct
relatedto theirparentingpractices.
This Article critically examines the common law of parental (non-)
liability, both historically and in light of current cultural trends. Parental
liability takes two forms: liabilityfor parents' harm to their children, and
liability of parents for harms caused to others by their children.
Individually these subjects have received remarkably little scholarly
attention; together they have received none. Yet both types of parental
liability are central to ongoing culturaldebates aboutparenting, as well as
to current controversies about the role of courts in establishing legal duty.
A thorough reconsiderationof parental liability is particularly timely in
light of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts, which speaks directly to
issues that are central to bothforms ofparentalliability.
This Article concludes that courts should holdparents to a standardof
reasonable care. The American common law's squeamishness about
parental liability is understandable, but unnecessary. Just as helicopter
parents overreact to unsubstantiatedfears of stranger abduction based on
anecdotes and media hype, limits on common law parental liability are
overreactions to unsubstantiated fears of collusion, government
interference and biased juries. To be sure, aspects of parental liability
*
Visiting Assistant Professor and Assistant Professor-Elect, University of Washington School of
Law. I am grateful to Helen Anderson, Toby Heytens, Stewart Jay, Lisa Manheim, Trevor Morrison,
Cristina Rodriguez, Kathryn Watts and Mary Whisner for helpful critiques of earlier drafts, and to
Michael Drummond for excellent research assistance. I also received insightful feedback from
workshops at Columbia Law School, the University of Washington School of Law, Seattle University
School of Law, and Lewis & Clark Law School.
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raise significant concerns, but courts can and should address them
narrowly using established tort law principles, without imposing blanket
no-duty rules. Juries, in short, should be allowed to judge parents.
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INTRODUCTION

The concept of common law parental liability is fraught, and its actual
existence is exceedingly unusual. This lack of liability is not due to a belief
that parents are irrelevant to the safety and conduct of children. To the
contrary, legal scholars, legal decisions and politicians recognize the
enormous value of parenting to the development of productive, functional
adult citizens.' Neither is it because American parents are above reproach.
Public figures consistently bemoan the impact on children of poor
parenting, and legislators in almost every state have passed statutes
imposing at least a symbolic form of strict liability on parents for certain
forms of children's misconduct. 2 The cruel underside of parental conducteven in highly educated, "traditional" two-parent families-was spotlighted
last autumn with the widespread dissemination of a video depicting a Texas
family law judge mercilessly beating his teenaged daughter with a belt
while her mother looked on. However loosely we define adequate
parenting, not all parents are meeting that standard. Yet for over a century,
since the first civil lawsuits against parents were filed, common law courts
have resisted exposing parents to civil liability. While aspects of this rule
have eased over time, it remains the rare case that survives summary
judgment or a motion to strike. These liability limitations apply not only in
tort suits by injured children against their parents, but also in so-called
negligent supervision suits, where third parties seek to hold parents liable
for children's tortious misconduct.
The proffered justifications for this anti-liability attitude have varied
superficially since the origin of these doctrines at the end of the nineteenth
century, but their gravamen is the same: Fear. Fear of intruding on family
privacy; fear of allowing the government to set a parenting standard,
thereby usurping parental authority; fear that parents and children will

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (stating that "[t]his primary role of the parents
1.
in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition"); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 164 (1st ed. 1827) ("Without some

preparation made in youth for the sequel of life, children of all conditions would probably become idle
and vicious when they grow up. . . ."); see also Katherine Brandon, A Town Hall on Fatherhood,
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (June 19, 2009, 7:39 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/A-Town-Hall-onFatherhood (observing that "[t]he message was clear-fathers can make a world of difference in the
lives of [their] children").
2.
See Lisa Gentile, Parental Civil Liability for the Torts of Minors, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 125 app. at 128-32 (2007) (listing parental liability statutes and observing that every state
except New Hampshire has one). Two states-Hawaii and Louisiana-enacted statutes holding parents
strictly liable for children's torts. Id.
3.
See Melissa Bell, Texas Judge William Adams Suspended After Video Surfaces of Him Beating
His Daughter, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2011, 8:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
blogpost/post/texas-judge-william-adams-suspended-after-video-surfaces-of-him-beating-hisdaughter/2011/l1/23/gIQACIYEoN blog.html.
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collude for insurance proceeds; fear of juries; and fear that parents will be
held liable merely for having a poorly behaved child.4 Recent scholarship
and cultural commentary has put a new face on these concerns by claiming
that the current generation of so-called "helicopter parents," who hover
over-protectively around their children, will establish an unrealistic and
even harmful standard of parental over-care.5 The result of these collective
apprehensions, both historically and today, is a sharp divide between the
common law's robust enforcement of parental rights, and its entrenched
reluctance to enforce parental responsibilities. 6
Such fears, which have justified minimizing parental liability for over a
century, are hardly irrational. The idea of jurors making post-hoc
assessments of one's parenting decisions is legitimately daunting.
Moreover, overregulation of the family is a genuine risk: Scholars have
correctly criticized the invasive, disempowering scrutiny of parenting
practices imposed on families that are dependent on public support or

4.
See, e.g., Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 732 A.2d 767, 773 (Conn. 1999) (given families'
"different cultural, educational and financial conditions," the court refused to allow juries, "ignorant of
a case's peculiar familial distinctions ... to second-guess a parent's management of family affairs");
Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Mass. 1938) (holding immunity necessary to prevent "intrusions,
not always disinterested, into the intimacies of family life"); Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338
(N.Y. 1974) (rejecting parental liability because "it would be the rare parent who could not conceivably
be called to account in the courts for his conduct toward his child"); Linder v. Bidner, 270 N.Y.S.2d
427, 430 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). ("There is no general responsibility for the rearing of incorrigible
children." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5.
See, e.g., LENORE SKENAZY, FREE RANGE KlDS 50-57 (2009) (describing peer pressure to
conform to dominant parenting standards); Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1221, 1222 (2011) (defining and decrying hyper-intensive parenting practices); David
Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the "Free Range Kid": Is Overprotective Parenting the New
Standardof Care? 2012 UTAH L. REv. 947 (2012); Margaret K. Nelson, Helicopter Moms. Headingfor
a Crash, WASH. POST (July 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2010/07/02/AR2010070202445.html ("Professional women bring considerable skills to raising
children, and because they do it so conscientiously, they may set trends for other parents.").
Corporal punishment by parents remains legal in every state and is used in some form by
6.
approximately 90% of parents. Deana Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575,
576-77 (2003). In addition, parents may still bring a cause of action against third parties who interfere
with parental custody over their children, see, e.g., Stone v. Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Fla. 1999)
(father had cause of action against matemal aunt and grandmother for custodial interference), and
parents still retain rights of control over their children's labor, see Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of
Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 852-53 (2004) (describing federal and state laws allowing parents
to approve children's farm labor for less than minimum wage at ages as young as 12). Professor
Wigmore first lamented the rights/responsibility divide almost eighty years ago. See John H. Wigmore,
Comment, Torts-Parent'sLiabilityfor Child's Torts, 19 ILL. L. REv. 202, 203 (1924-1925):
As between parent and child, there may be four principal legal relations of right-duty, viz.,
(a) the parent's right to control the child; i.e., to beat him, and to make him work for the
parent; (b) the parent's duty to support the child during minority. . . ; (c) the parent's duty to
bequeath to the child a fair portion of the family estate . . . [;] and (d) the parent's duty to
compensate third persons injured by the child's misconduct. The first of these-the selfish,
profitable one-is recognized, to the parent's benefit, in our law; the second, third and
fourth-the humane complements of the first-are not recognized.
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otherwise fail to conform to idealized traditional norms.7 Nevertheless, the
problem of overregulation of some parents is not solved by exempting
other parents from legal constraints. Similar restrictions on suits between
spouses have been rejected as vestiges of an unjust past. There can be, and
should be, a middle ground.
Until very recently, parental liability has been overlooked in legal
scholarship. As Jill Elaine Hasday observed, parental liability is not part of
the family law canon-the set of legal narratives that defines American
families and their relationship to the state. 8 Tort scholars, too, have paid
scant attention to parental liability.9 Unlike inter-spousal immunity, which
has been rendered infamous (and largely obsolete) under feminist critiques,
the doctrines of parental immunity and negligent parental supervision have
largely flown below the legal and cultural radar.10 Very recently
commentators have begun to criticize the parental immunity doctrine, not
for being unnecessary or unjust, but for being insufficiently protective of

See, e.g., Bernstein & Triger, supra note 5, at 1268 (describing prejudice against African7.
American parenting practices dating from post-emancipation era to current day); Elaine M. Chiu, The
Culture Difference in ParentalAutonomy, 41 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1773, 1820 (2008) (noting the
predominantly Anglo-American culture of decision makers in the child welfare system is "an important
factor" in the quality of those decisions); Jill Elaine Hasday, ParenthoodDivided: A Legal History of
the Bifurcated Law of ParentalRelations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 329-47 (2002) (arguing that beginning in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states authorized extensive regulation of families deemed nonconforming) [hereinafter Hasday, ParenthoodDivided]; Laura Sullivan & Amy Walters, Incentives and
2011),
Cultural Bias Fuel Foster System, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 25,
(describing
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/25/141662357/incentives-and-cultural-bias-fuel-foster-system
removal by child welfare services of Native American grandchildren from home without investigation
and unlawful placement of those children in non-Native family).
See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 852-53 (2004)
8.
(noting that the treatment of children as property-including in parental immunity cases-has been
overlooked by family law scholars) [hereinafter Hasday, Canon ofFamily Law].
The primary scholarly analysis of the parental immunity doctrine is Gail Hollister, Parent9.
Child Immunity: A Doctrine in Search ofJustification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 494-98 (1982); see
also Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the
Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1161 (1991); Irene Hansen Saba, Parental Immunity from Tort:
Evolution of a Doctrine in Tennessee, 36 U. MEM. L. REv. 829 (2006). Scholarly commentary on
parents' liability for their children's torts consists primarily of descriptive notes and comments framed
against a background of school shootings. See, e.g., Valerie D. Barton, Comment, Reconciling the
Burden: Parental Liability for the Tortious Acts of Minors, 51 EMORY L.J. 877 (2002); Andrew C.
Gratz, Symposium Comment, Increasing the Price of Parenthood: When Should Parents Be Held
Civilly Liable for the Torts of Their Children?, 39 Hous. L. REV. 169 (2002) (focusing on Texas);
Jeffrey L. Skaare, Note, The Development and Current Status of ParentalLiability for the Torts of
Minors, 76 N.D. L. REV. 89 (2000); Elena R. Laskin, Note, How ParentalLiability Statutes Criminalize
and Stigmatize Minority Mothers, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1195 (2000); see also Rhonda V. Magee
Andrews, The Justice ofParentalAccountability: Hypothetical DisinterestedCitizens and Real Victims'
Voices in the Debate Over Expanded ParentalLiability, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 375 (2002) (examining
theories of justice as applied to school shooting cases to argue for increased liability).
10.
See Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule ofLove ": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105 YALE
L.J. 2117 (1996) (critiquing inter-spousal immunity).
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parental rights." This Article takes a contrary stance, urging a focus on
parental responsibility rather than rights, and arguing that-fear asidethere is no evidence that parents require a carve-out from traditional
common law rules.
The publication of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts, which
confronts many of the negligence issues central to parental liability
questions, provides a timely occasion on which to reevaluate parental
liability. The general duty provisions of the Restatement (Third), published
in 2010, as well as the soon-to-be-published provision addressing
affirmative duties, involve subtle but significant attempts by the American
Law Institute's reporters to recalibrate the balance of decision making
power between judges and juries on the basis that judges have gradually
usurped the role of fact finders. 12 Parental liability cases provide a
quintessential example of such usurpation.
In Parts I and II, this Article critiques both forms of common law
parental liability from the nineteenth century to the present day. Part I
traces the evolution of parental immunity as a legal limit on parental duty.
Part II examines limits on parents' duty to prevent children from injuring
others. Part III analyzes both forms of parental liability in light of the new
Restatement (Third) of Torts and argues that its provisions support the
imposition of a standard of reasonable care on parents. As this Part also
shows, the duty problems in parental liability cases transcend this area of
the law, creating judicial distortions in negligence law more broadly. Part
IV responds to the fears that fuel parental liability limits, including privacy,
collusion, and the fear that helicopter parents will create irrationally high
standards for parental conduct.
Parental liability, like parenting itself, is legitimately frightening.
Nevertheless, parenthood entails responsibility as well as rights, and
parents, like all other tortfeasors, should be held to a standard of reasonable
care. This Article does not propose an expansion of tort law that would
create new and parent-specific causes of action in tort. It does not propose,
for example, that children be able to sue their parents for their failure to
help make a child's high school resume sufficiently glittering for college
entrance.13 But just as parents may overreact to media hype and
11.
See, e.g., Berstein & Triger, supra note 5, at 1250; Pimentel, supra note 5, at 956 (arguing
that case upholding parental immunity "may prove to be the last gasp of the policy of protecting that
erstwhile sacred right of parents to decide how to raise their own children").
12.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt.
b (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM §§ 37-44 (Proposed Final

Draft No. 1, 2005).
See Benjamin Shmueli, Love and the Law, Children Against Mothers and Fathers, Or:
13.
What s Love Got to Do With It?, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131 (2010) (proposing new judicial
structure based on Israeli law wherein children could obtain relief for emotional non-support from
parents).
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overprotecting their children, courts and scholars who support limits on
parental liability are overreacting to exaggerated fears of judicial excess,
fears that have not materialized in the many states that are moving to
eliminate special treatment for parents in tort. In appropriate cases, juries
should be allowed to judge parents.
I. PARENTAL IMMUNITY:
THE "DARK SIDE" OF FAMILY PRIVACY 4
The parental immunity doctrine, which bars children's tort suits against
their parents, is a classic example of the state allocating benefits and
burdens among family members in a way that regulates family life in a
particular-and conservative-manner in the guise of non-interference and
respect for family privacy." Like its cousin inter-spousal immunity,
parent-child immunity supports and perpetuates a power structure rooted in
pre-nineteenth-century concepts of a hierarchical, nuclear family-a
structure that continues to be understood as ideal and normal.' 6 The modem
iteration of the privacy rationale for parental immunity, which tracks
twentieth-century Supreme Court language protective of parental discretion
and autonomy, continues to resonate with courts.
Despite its long history, as Jill Elaine Hasday observes, parental
immunity is not part of the family law canon." Hasday attributes this
omission to a tendency of family law scholarship to overstate the extent to
which legal treatment of children as parental property is wrongly viewed as
a relic of the distant past. But the story of parental immunity-like that of
inter-spousal immunity-should be represented in family law and tort law.
Both historically and today, the parental immunity doctrine demonstrates
the power and resilience of judicial discourse in shaping status
relationships within families. It also illustrates the way in which
constitutional rhetoric (if not constitutional reasoning) permeates the
common law. Subpart A traces parental immunity from its ignominious
origins in 1891 through to its modem form. Subpart B shows how feminist
criticism of inter-spousal immunity effectively nullified that doctrine, while
See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Dark Side of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
14.
1247, 1247 (1999) (observing risks to children of policies of non-interference in families).
15.
William E. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030,
1030 (1930) ("Here is waged a battle between conflicting conceptions of the family, between individual
and relational rights and duties.").
16.
See Siegel, supra note 10, at 2166-67 (arguing that family privacy "supplied grounds on
which to justify interspousal tort immunity-grounds that were seemingly independent of the
increasingly discredited language of marital hierarchy").
Hasday, Canon ofFamily Law, supra note 8, at 852.
17.
See id. at 848-49 (arguing that one inaccurate story "in the family law canon is that common
18.
law property norms no longer shape the law of parenthood").
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parental liability-overlooked by activists and scholars-has remained a
potent force.
A. ParentalImmunity: A Tradition ofNon-Interference
in (Some) Families
The physical sanctity of the home is an ancient concept, but judicial
use of privacy-a theory of non-interference by the state in family affairsemerged as a common law limit on tort liability during the nineteenth
century. Before then, patriarchy prevented intra-family suits: Most
American household members were subject to the unquestionable
patriarchal authority of fathers, who wielded immense physical and legal
power. This power included a father's right to physically discipline his wife
and children; 9 his right of full control over his wife's property and legal
identity; 20 his right to apprentice his children out and keep the earnings or
use their services at home;21 his sole right of custody over his children; 22
and his right to recover in tort for loss of services if someone injured or
seduced one of his children.23 Under patriarchy, neither women nor
children were in a position to bring tort lawsuits against all-powerful
fathers.2 4 Patriarchy slowly disintegrated during the nineteenth century, and
women became seen as ascendant in the domestic sphere.25 Despite (and in
part because of) these changes, the power asymmetry between men and
19.
On the right of fathers to discipline their children, see, e.g., TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF
BARON AND FEMME 287 (2d ed. 1846) ("The parent is bound to correct a child, so as to prevent him
from becoming the victim of vicious habits, and thereby proving a nuisance to the community."); 2
KENT, supra note 1, at 170 (noting that fathers are entitled to impose "moderate correction, under the
exercise of a sound discretion"). On the right of men to chastise their wives, see Siegel, supra note 10,
at 2122-29 (tracing tradition and criticism of marital chastisement).
20.
See Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 219 (1931) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating that
after marriage "that husband and wife are one, and that one the husband").
21.
See Lee Teitelbaum, The Legal History of the Family, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1052 (1987)
(reviewing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985)); see also Carol Sanger,

Separating From Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 396-99 (1996) (describing colonial practice of
apprenticing children).
22.
See 2 KENT, supra note 1, at 171 (noting that if a father died without assigning a guardian, a
child's mother would act as guardian until the child reached fourteen, at which point the child would
choose his or her own guardian).
23.
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 269 nn.1-4 (2d ed. 1888) (citing cases)
(hereinafter COOLEY ON TORTS); see also Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2758
(2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining parents' ability to "bring tort suits against those who
knowingly enticed a minor away from them").
24.
Leslie Bender, Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 8
(1988).
25.
See STEVEN MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS 55-60 (1988) (describing
redefinition of women's roles). Many Americans, particularly slaves, were shut off from this evolution
by legal restrictions on their rights or by poverty. Id. at 67-70; see also STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF PRIVATE LIFE 151 (1988) (observing that legal and cultural reforms "had little
meaning for lower-class women").
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other household members persisted. 2 6 Parental immunity, like inter-spousal
immunity before it, is an outgrowth of this patriarchal regime.
Unlike inter-spousal immunity, parental immunity is a uniquely
American phenomenon.27 The doctrine, which first appeared in 1891, is
typically attributed to the first three cases holding that parents are immune
28
from tort suits by their children. Commentators have referred to these
cases as the "great trilogy," but there is nothing Tolkienesque about them.2 9
They are short, devoid of citations, and poorly reasoned.30 Yet parental
immunity swayed courts nationwide: The prospect of children suing their
parents caused widespread, visceral discomfort."
Although sometimes depicted as having appeared out of thin air, the
doctrine's appearance was the product of multiple related historical
developments in the second half of the nineteenth century. American and
British courts began recognizing tort immunity between spouses in the
mid-nineteenth century, as the gradual demise of coverture raised the
possibility of women suing their husbands. 3 2 Moreover, toward the end of
the nineteenth century courts began, albeit incrementally and in a
haphazard way, to recognize an incipient affirmative right to privacy in tort
law.33 The first parental immunity case appeared the year following
publication of Louis Brandeis's and Samuel Warren's path-marking article,
The Right to Privacy, which ushered in dignitary privacy as a touchstone of

Fathers still retained a right to corporally punish their children. See TIFFANY'S PERSONS &
26.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 264-66 (1909). In addition, they retained a presumptive right to custody (except
sometimes for very young children) and a right to their children's earnings. See id. at 267-71 (custody);
id. at 276-79 (stating that a mother was entitled to her child's earnings only on death or desertion of the
father). Though middle- and upper-class women had improved legal rights and access to education,
these reforms "were linked to a stricter definition of all women as wives and mothers. As with slavery,
the softening was also a tightening." COONTZ, supranote 25, at 151.
See Hollister, supra note 9, at 489 (arguing parent-child immunity was created by American
27.
courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but has antecedents in Roman law).
See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664
28.
(Tenn. 1903); Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905).
See, e.g., Rooney & Rooney, supra note 9, at 1163; Carolyn L. Andrews, Comment, Parent29.
Child Torts in Texas and the Reasonable Prudent Parent Standard, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 113, 114
(1989).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. a (1979) (rejecting early
30.
justifications for parental immunity); Hollister, supra note 9, at 496-507 (1982); McCurdy, supra note
15, at 1030.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G cmt. a (1979) (stating that complete parental
31.
immunity was accepted by almost all American jurisdictions until the 1960s).
See Siegel, supra note 10, at 2168.
32.
In addition to the intra-family immunity cases-which recognized privacy in the negative-a
33.
few nineteenth-century decisions appeared to recognize an affirmative right to privacy. See, e.g., De
May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 147 (Mich. 1881) (granting damages for violation of plaintiffs "legal
right to the privacy of her apartment" during childbirth); Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589, 591 (1880)
(holding that houseguest's privacy was invaded by homeowner).
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modem tort law.34 From the first, family privacy has been the primary
justification for parental immunity.
Courts treated parental immunity as a natural extension of inter-spousal
immunity.36 Yet whereas under coverture a woman's legal identity merged
with that of her husband upon marriage, children were always independent
legal beings under the common law. Unlike women, children could enforce
their property and contract rights, including against parents; 3 7 they could be
independently liable in contract or tort; and there was never a testimonial
privilege between parents and children analogous to that between
spouses.38 Therefore, while marital unity had formally prevented married
women from bringing suit against their husbands,39 it was assumed by
scholars and treaty writers prior to 1891 that the common law would allow
tort suits by children against their parents, at least in cases of extreme
violence.40 Prior to 1891, however, there were no actual examples of
34.
Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Intra-family immunity suits were both symptoms and harbingers of privacy's emergence as a paradigm
of modem legal thought in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. In addition to the changes in
family life during the nineteenth century, judges may have been influenced by broader privacy-related
developments, including the rise of the yellow press, popular resistance to government efforts to collect
and/or publicize sensitive personal information, and the impact on conceptions of privacy of mass
immigration. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 128 (2007) (stating that between 1850 and 1890, the number of
newspapers increased from 100 to 900, and the number of readers grew from approximately 800,000 to
more than 8 million); see generally DAVID R. SPENCER, THE YELLOW JOURNALISM (2007); see also
PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 46-47 (1995) (describing increasing tension regarding

census information during the nineteenth century and outrage in 1890 over census questions about
diseases, handicaps, and home mortgages). Indeed, Brandeis's and Warren's article was prompted at
least in part by Warren's frustration with media gossip about his marital life. See Edward J. Bloustein,
Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 966
(1964).
At first privacy was one element in a laundry list of justifications for parent-child immunity.
35.
The list also included a fear that the injured child might die and the tortfeasor parent would then inherit
the child's damages award; that the award would deplete the family treasury to the detriment of other
family members; and the possibility of insurance fraud. Over time, courts dropped these justifications as
illogical or unpersuasive. See Hollister, supra note 9, at 494-98 (critiquing various justifications for
immunity and observing that courts eventually settled on their most persuasive rationale, the need for
domestic tranquility and parental authority).
See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (Wash. 1905); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 895G
36.
cmt. c (courts imposing parental immunity "relied heavily upon the analogy of husband and wife").
See, e.g., McCurdy, supra note 15, at 1057-58 (citing cases and explaining that the parent
37.
"may voluntarily relinquish his right to services and earnings, even to the point of promising the child
wages, and such relinquishment or promise has legal effect"); see also Hollister,supra note 9, at 495,
497 (stating that in contrast to married women, "[clhildren had separate legal identities and could both
sue and be sued").
38.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

122 (5th ed. 1984).

39.
See COOLEY ON TORTS, supra note 23, at 267 (stating that a woman has no cause of action for
a tort to her person or reputation, but "must rely upon the criminal laws for her protection, or seek relief
in separation or in proceedings for a divorce").
40.

See COOLEY ON TORTS, supra note 23, at 171; TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND

FEMME 287 (2d ed. 1846) (arguing that a parent "may so chastise his child, as to be liable in an action
by the child against him for a battery"); McCurdy, supra note 15, at 1062 (analyzing cases and
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children litigating against their parents in tort. 4 1 Aided by this lack of
precedent, courts brushed away the distinction between women and
children and ruled that suits by children were against the natural order.42
1. Early ParentalImmunity: Family Harmony Above All
Early decisions implementing parental immunity adhered closely to the
language and reasoning of inter-spousal immunity-language that idealized
the sanctity and harmony of the home.4 3 The plaintiff in Hewellette v.
George brought suit against her mother for wrongfully committing her to
an insane asylum. While acknowledging that the plaintiff had suffered
compensable damages, the court rejected her cause of action:
The peace of society and of the families composing society, and a
sound public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to
appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent.44
In a similar vein, in Roller v. Roller, the Supreme Court of Washington
rejected a battery suit by a fifteen-year-old girl against her father, who had
already been criminally convicted of raping her, in the name of "preserving
harmony in the domestic relations," and "the privacy and mutual
confidence which should obtain in the household."45 Conceding that the
rape might already have destroyed harmony in the plaintiff s case, the court
nevertheless denied her claim, "for the same principle which would allow
the action in the case of a heinous crime, like the one involved in this case,

concluding that "[i]t seems to be assumed that a parent is subject to some civil liability"); see also
Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (holding that two-year-old left unattended in
street injured by horse-drawn sleigh could not obtain damages from driver, but stating in dictum that
child should seek damages from neglectful parents); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) (admitting
cause of action against teacher for excessive punishment by analogy to right of action of child against
parent).
41.
See, e.g., Matarese v. Matarese, 131 A. 198 (R.I. 1925) (contrasting absence of tort claims by
children prior to 1891 with criminal prosecutions against parents); Wick v. Wick, 212 N.W. 787, 787
(Wis. 1963) (observing that "[n]o case involving this question appears to have come before any
appellate court in England or America prior to 1891").
42.
See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (N.C. 1923) (finding parental immunity
"unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tablets of Mount Sinai").
43.
Siegel, supra note 10, at 2165-68.
44.
Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891). The unprecedented holding was
particularly strange given that the minor plaintiff was married (though separated from her husband).
Though acknowledging that a suit might be possible if the parent-child relationship were dissolved
upon marriage, the court found that "[o]n this very delicate and difficult point in the case the evidence is
most unsatisfactory." Id.
45.
Roller v. Roller, 79 P. 788, 788-89 (Wash. 1905).
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would allow an action to be brought for any other tort." 4 6 Other courts
followed Hewellette and Roller, revolting at the idea of "intrusions, not
always disinterested, into the intimacies of family life." 47 As one court later
phrased it, "the 'sanctity' [of the home] also includes the 'secrecy' of the
home."4 8
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, courts invoked
familial love and intimacy to authorize conduct by parents toward their
children that would be plainly unlawful outside of the domestic setting. As
in the inter-spousal context, courts employed "tropes of interiority"metaphorical descriptions of the home as a physical refuge-to give depth
to their descriptions of intra-familial love.49 This is perhaps best
exemplified by the Wisconsin Supreme Court's panegyric to family life in
1927:
The family is a social unit. The members thereof are of the same
blood. They are bound together by the strongest natural ties.
Naturally, mutual love and affection obtain between the members
thereof. There is a mutual interest in one another's welfare. The
family fireside is a place of repose and happiness.

. ..

To question

the authority of the parent or to encourage the disobedience of the
child is to impair the peace and happiness of the family and
undermine the wholesome influence of the home. To permit a child
to maintain an action in tort against the parent is to introduce
discord and contention where the laws of nature have established
peace and obedience.o
The Wick court's poetic vision is particularly ironic given that
Wisconsin had decided only the previous year to allow inter-spousal tort
suits. 51 The court conceded that the discrepancy, "(made necessary by
statute) mars somewhat the symmetry and beauty of the family
conception," but refused to adjust its view of parental duty in view of the

Id. at 789.
46.
Luster v. Luster, 13 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Mass. 1938). The Luster court also repeated the
47.
concern that such suits "would almost inevitably tend to the destruction of the peace and unity of family
life and to the impairment of parental authority and discipline." Id.; see also York Trust Co. v. Blum, 22
Pa. D & C 313, 314 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1934) (holding it "better that an occasional wrong should go
unrequited than that the family life should be subjected to the disrupting effects of such suits").
48.
Streenz v. Streenz, 471 P.2d 282, 286 (Ariz. 1970) (McFarland, J., dissenting).
49.
Siegel, supra note 10, at 2120.
Wick v. Wick, 212 N.W. 787, 787 (Wis. 1927), abrogatedby Goller v. White 122 N.W.2d
50.
193 (Wis. 1963).
Wait v. Pierce, 209 N.W. 475, 480-481 (Wis. 1926) (holding a wife may bring action against
51.
her husband).
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change. 5 2 Indeed, parent-child immunity developed later than inter-spousal
immunity, but it has had greater staying power.
2. Modern ParentalImmunity: The Zone ofParentalAutonomy
Since the 1950s, the harsh total bar of the early parental immunity
cases has gradually given way to a narrowed-but doctrinally
strengthened-form of tort protection for parents. A handful of states never
recognized parent-child immunity, 53 and eleven states have abrogated it
entirely,54 but most states have retained the doctrine in a modified form that
shields parents from liability for a wide range of conduct considered
"inherent to the parent-child relationship." Courts have defined such
conduct to exclude intra-family suits arising out of car accidents; 56
employment-related accidents; 57 and willful or malicious torts.58
These exceptions have not rendered parent-child immunity a marginal
doctrine on its way to extinction. 5 9 To the contrary, over half of states
retain a broad zone of parental immunity for parental acts that are deemed
to be (in courts' view) inherent in parental discipline or control. For
example, courts have routinely applied the immunity where parents have
negligently allowed children to drown, burn, or get run over by a car.60

52.
53.

Wick, 212 N.W. at 788.
The District of Columbia, Hawaii, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah and Vermont do not

recognize immunity. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER,

WADE & SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 631 (12th ed. 2010); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 781 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. 2001)
(collecting cases). South Dakota appears not to have considered this question, but a federal district court
applying South Dakota law has applied immunity. See Brunner v. Hutchinson Div., Lear-Siegler, 770 F.
Supp. 517 (D.S.D. 1991).
54.
At least eleven jurisdictions have abolished parental immunity. See, e.g., Broadbent v.
Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43 (Ariz. 1995); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal. 1971) (eliminating doctrine
as a "legal anachronism, riddled with exceptions"); Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
55.
Cates v. Cates, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729 (ill. 1993).
56.
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611 (Md. 2003) (implementing statute abrogating
immunity for suits arising out of car accidents, and noting that only eight states continued to apply the
immunity in the context of motor vehicle torts in 1984); Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984);
Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1994). This is a huge exception to parental immunity,
and highlights inconsistencies in the doctrine. After all, driving one's children around is not only
"inherent" to the parent-child relationship, during some years it practically defines it.
57.
See, e.g., Chase v. New Haven Waste Material Corp., 150 A. 107, 108 (Conn. 1930).
58.
See, e.g., Newman v. Cole, 872 So. 2d 138, 140 (Ala. 2003) (abrogating parental immunity in
wrongful death suit, but imposing heightened "clear and convincing" standard of proof); Henderson v.
Wooley, 644 A.2d 1303, 1307 (Conn. 1994) (responding to certified question from federal court)
(abrogating immunity for child sexual abuse); Herzfeld v. Herzfeld, 781 So. 2d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2001)
(same).
59.
See also Frye v. Frye, 505 A.2d 826 (Md. 1986), superseded by statute as recognized in
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kim, 829 A.2d 611 (Md. 2003).
60.
See Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497 (Wash. 2008) (upholding parental immunity in
drowning death that appeared accidental); Talerico v. Foremost Ins. Co., 712 P.2d 294 (Wash. 1986)
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The theme of parental authority-which crept into the immunity
rationale over time, distinguishing parental immunity from inter-spousal
immunity-increasingly echoed twentieth-century Supreme Court language
extolling the centrality of parental autonomy to family and political life.
Beginning in 1925 with Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
and continuing through Justice Thomas's recent dissent in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants' Association, the Court has stressed the
fundamental importance of parental authority. 61 The Court's holdings have
never been as broad as its rhetoric, but the concept of parental discretionnow associated with a constitutional privacy interest-has permeated
modem parental immunity law. The leading case defining modem parental
immunity, Goller v. White, relied on this Supreme Court privacy discourse
to redefine the scope of parental immunity.62
Inspired by Goller, other courts have similarly ruled that the doctrine is
rooted in "the need to avoid judicial intervention into the core of
parenthood and parental discipline."63 A Texas court explained this
reinvigorated immunity doctrine in 1992 in a case arising from the
drowning death of a child in its mother's care: "The discharge of parental
responsibilities, such as the provision of a home, food, and schooling,
entails countless matters of personal, private choice. In the absence of
culpability beyond ordinary negligence, those choices are not subject to
review in court." 64 To this strengthened judicial immunity discourse, courts
have gradually added an element of cultural relativism, arguing that courts
and juries cannot fairly assess parental actions "[c]onsidering the different
economic, educational, cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds which
** 65
must prevail" among families.

(upholding immunity in death of three-year-old left unattended by backyard fire). The idea that driving
one's children around is outside the boundaries of the parent-child relationship is simply laughable.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (rejecting state law mandating
61.
public education contrary to parents' wishes on the ground that "those who nurture [the child] and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations"); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (stating that "[ojur jurisprudence historically
has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over
minor children"); Brown v. Entm't Merch. Ass'n., 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2752 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he historical evidence shows that the founding generation believed parents
had absolute authority over their minor children and expected parents to use that authority to direct the
proper development of their children").
Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963).
62.
Hush v. Devilbiss Co., 259 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) (immunity protected
63.
grandmother who was supervising child who was severely burned in vaporizer spill).
Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd., 826 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. 1992).
64.
65.
Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974); see also Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc.,
732 A.2d 767, 773 (Conn. 1999) (Given families' "different cultural, educational and financial
conditions," the court refused to allow juries "ignorant of a case's peculiar familial distinctions ... to
second-guess a parent's management of family affairs." (quoting Dubay v. Irish, 542 A.2d 711 (Conn.
1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The modem version of parental immunity nevertheless retains traces of
the idealized image of parental love that was central in Wick and other
earlier cases. In its landmark decision barring children's claims against
parents, the New York Court of Appeals referred back to the concept,
originating at least as far back as Blackstone, that parental affection should
displace any legal compulsion: "The mutual obligations of the parent-child
relation derive their strength and vitality from such forces as natural
instinct, love and morality, and not from the essentially negative
compulsions of the law's directives and sanctions."66 For these reasons150 years after a New York court found it "absurd" that a parent would not
bear legal responsibility for a young child left unattended on a public
highway-the Court of Appeals held that New York did not recognize a
cause of action against a parent for her child's injury. 6 7 Holodook remains
the law in New York today.
3. Modern Expansion ofParentalImmunity to Others In Loco Parentis
Parental immunity thus remains influential in cases alleging a wide
range of parental negligence. In fact, its scope has expanded in key
respects. At the time of the publication of the second Restatement in the
1960s, parent-child immunity had not frequently been extended to protect
individuals in loco parentis.6 8 But that trend has since reversed course.69
Reasoning that to allow juries to "supplant their own views for the parent's
individual child-rearing philosophy" would "accord[] too little respect for
family autonomy and parental discretion," the Washington Supreme Court
recently held that immunity could bar suits against step-parents who have
assumed the obligations of parenthood.70 Other courts have ruled
similarly.7 '
66.
67.

Holodook, 324 N.E.2d at 346.
See id. at 346.

68.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 895G

cmt. i (1963) (noting lack of application to

those other than parents). But see, e.g., Trudell v. Leatherby, 300 P. 7 (Cal. 1931) (immunity applied to
step-parent in loco parentis).
69.
See, e.g., Mitchell v. Davis, 598 So. 2d 801 (Ala. 1992) (foster parents entitled to limited
immunity from claims of "simple negligence" because in loco parentis); Lyles v. Jackson, 223 S.E.2d
873 (Va. 1976) (step-parent immune if in loco parentis); Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497 (Wash.
2008) (same); Langley v. Langley, No. 10-03-00383-CV, 2004 WL 2804828 (Tex. App. Nov. 24, 2004)
(stepmother entitled to immunity). But see Warren v. Warren, 650 A.2d 252 (Md. 1994) (refusing to
extend immunity to step-parents); Rayburn v. Moore, 241 So. 2d 675 (Miss. 1970) (same).
70.
Zellmer, 188 P.3d at 503. The court in Zellmer remanded for a factual determination of
whether the defendant stepfather had acted in loco parentis. Ultimately the civil case ended when the
stepfather was prosecuted and convicted of murder for intentionally drowning the three-year-old
plaintiff in his backyard pool shortly after obtaining life insurance coverage for her. See Jennifer
Sullivan, Kent Man Convicted of Killing 3-Year-Old Stepdaughter, SEATTLE TivtES (Apr. 28, 2010),

http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2011728076_zellmer29m.html.
71.
See, e.g., Langley, 2004 WL 2804828 at *1; Lyles, 223 S.E.2d at 798.
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Given its shaky historical underpinnings and harsh consequences, the
expansion of immunity to cover additional parental figures is troubling.
Children are vastly more likely to be abused or neglected by step-parents
than by natural parents.7 2 The early parental immunity cases, many of
which involved abusive step-parents, bear this out. 73 Step-parents and
foster parents may assume a parenting role for complex reasons that do not
make a child's wellbeing a top priority. Although the Washington Supreme
Court required a factual finding that a step-parent was acting in loco
parentis,such a finding-which might take into account financial support,
child minding, and visits with teachers-will inevitably be incapable of
assessing the psychological commitment of a newcomer parent. The
expansion of the immunity to cover other parental figures, while it might
reflect societal changes in our understanding of parenthood, in fact
heightens the likelihood that a child will suffer un-redressed harm.
4. Impact ofImmunity on Comparative Negligence
The impact of parental immunity also extends beyond intra-family
disputes. Despite some early cases to the contrary, courts generally did not
impute parents' contributory negligence to an injured child so as to defeat
the child's claim against a third party.74 But in modem comparative fault
regimes, where a parent's liability and the liability of a third party combine
to injure a child, most courts hold that parental immunity prohibits
contribution actions against parents. In Crotta v. Home Depot, for example,
a child sued for severe brain injuries sustained when he fell or jumped out
of the back of a shopping cart.7 The defendants, Home Depot and the
shopping cart manufacturer, sought to implead the father, who had placed
his child in the back of the cart and supervised him while in the store.76 The
court held that the parental immunity doctrine, which protected the father
from suit by his son, also barred contribution claims by the defendants,
who would have to bear any liability for the boy's injury alone.n In these
72.

Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, THE TRUTH ABOUT CINDERELLA 28 (1999) (stating that young

children are one hundred times more likely to be abused or killed by non-genetic parents); Owen D.
Jones, EvolutionaryAnalysis in Law: An Introduction andApplication to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV.
1117, 1207-08 (1997) (noting particular danger of substitute fathers).
See Tresman v. Tresman, 61 N.E. 961 (Ind. Ct. App. 1901); McKelvey v. Mckelvey, 77 S.W.
73.
664 (Tenn. 1903).
See, e.g., Daley v. Norwich & Worcester R.R. Co., 26 Conn. 591, 597 (1858) (parents'
74.
negligence, if any, does not defeat three-year-old's action for injuries from train, although it "might be a
defence to an action by the father . .. for loss of service"); Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 345
(N.Y. 1974) (describing statute nullifying early cases that imputed parental negligence to children
injured by third parties).
See Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 732 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1999).
75.
Id. at 769-70.
76.
See id. at 772.
77.
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cases, too, family privacy is the dominant theme, overriding the interest in
fair allocation of responsibility among joint tortfeasors.7 8 As a result,
parents are subject to a drastically lowered standard of care with respect to
their children, while other parties must satisfy traditional tort law norms for
injuries arising out of a single incident. 79
B. Feminism and Intra-family Immunity: Complicating
the Role of Women
Parental immunity and inter-spousal immunity came into being during
the same period, and they were based on identical legal justifications.so But
they have met different fates: Inter-spousal immunity is now generally
obsolete, while parental immunity remains a robust, if modified, doctrine.
In addition, critiques of inter-spousal immunity have become part of the
scholarly canons of family and privacy law, while parental immunity has
been largely overlooked. To some extent, this is because feminist activists
and scholars-who have been the primary critics of family privacy-have
understandably focused on remedying harm and inequality to women.
Recent critical gender theory complicates assumptions inherent in these
feminist critiques by demonstrating that men can be victims, not merely

78.
See id. at 773 ("Courts should not unnecessarily involve themselves in the day-to-day
exercise of parental discretion regarding the upbringing and care of children. To do so would undermine
parental authority in the very personal endeavor of child rearing and inject the machinery of the state
into an area where its presence might be the occasion for family discord.").
79.
See also, e.g., Brunner v. Hutchinson Div., Lear-Siegler, 770 F. Supp. 517 (D.S.D. 1991) (in
light of South Dakota's immunity rule, auger manufacturer could not seek contribution in suit by twoand-a-half-year-old for traumatic arm amputation); Shoemake v. Fogel, 826 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1992)
(apartment complex owners could not seek contribution from mother in case arising from drowning
death of child); Jenkins v. Snohomish Cty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 713 P.2d 79, 83 (Wash. 1986)
(holding that public utility could not seek contribution or indemnity from parents for injury of sevenyear-old who climbed utility fence and was electrocuted, requiring amputation of arm); Almli v.
Santora, 397 N.W.2d 216 (Mich. App. 1986) (no contribution in suit arising from child's sledding
accident even in suit brought by parents in their own capacity); Parsons v. Wham-O, Inc. 541 N.Y.S.2d
44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (manufacturer of water slide could not seek contribution); Kelchner v. John
Deere Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (manufacturer of tractor mower not entitled to
contribution from mother for negligent supervision of four-year-old).
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, § 122 ("Although it would appear that no shadow of a
80.
difference in principle or policy is to be discovered, the retreat from the common law as to parent and
child has lagged behind that as to husband and wife . . . .").
81.
See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359 (1989) (noting
the overwhelming trend of abrogation). Compare, e.g., Freehe v. Freehe, 500 P.2d 771 (Wash. 1972)
(eliminating inter-spousal immunity) with Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 503 (Wash. 2008)
(retaining parental immunity in cases of negligence because "[s]ubjecting parents to liability for
negligent supervision inevitably allows judges and juries to supplant their own views for the parent's
individual child-rearing philosophy"); see also Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 464-65 (Md. 2003)
(agreeing with the vast majority of courts that inter-spousal immunity is "a vestige of the past, being
unsound in the circumstances of modem life, has outlived its usefulness, if ever it had any").
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beneficiaries, of misogynistic gender norms.8 2 Parental immunity cases
present the opposite phenomenon: They demonstrate that women, like men,
reap and will exploit the benefits of judicial non-interference in family life
to the extent that status allows. Yet the story of women as aggressors-as
abusers or neglecters within the family-has been omitted from privacy
critiques and from the dominant narrative of intra-family immunity.
Catharine MacKinnon led feminists' attack on family privacy as a tool
for preserving men's dominance over and violence against women in the
home; in her view, privacy is a "sword in men's hand," while it is
"presented as a shield in women's." 83 MacKinnon and others also criticize
privacy for perpetuating class injustices. 84 Neither of these foundational
privacy critiques, however, addresses the impact of family privacy on
children.8 5 Another strain of privacy theory takes the opposite stance,
criticizing excessive state scrutiny of certain parents, particularly single
mothers, as a harmful violation of family privacy. 86 Martha Fineman, for
example, would grant privacy to a "caretaker-dependent relationship," in
order to provide autonomy to single parents without pressure to conform to
a state-sanctioned parenting model. Implicit in such critiques is the view

82.
Analyzing male-on-male prison rape, for example, Kim Shayo Buchanan fills a gap in
feminist theory by describing the extent to which men who fail to conform to idealized versions of
masculinity are victims of discriminatory and violent conduct that parallels the experience of women.
Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender, and the Rule of Law, 29 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 23-46 (2010) (critiquing racial and gender constructs in male-on-male violence in
prisons and in the context of Title VII suits).
83.

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989)

(urging women to "explode the private"); Anita L. Allen, Privacy at Home: The Twofold Problem, in
REVISIONING THE POLITICAL: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN
POLITICAL THEORY 193 (Nancy J. Hirschmann & Christine Di Stefano eds., 1996); SUSAN MOLLER
OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1989); Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private
Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 847 (2000).
84.
See MACKINNON, supra note 83, at 191 ("Women with privileges, including class privileges,
get rights."); Allen, supra note 83, at 197 ("[I]n the United States domestic privacy is a virtual
commodity purchased by the middle class and the well-to-do.").
85.
Psychoanalyst Alice Miller argues that "the feminist movement .. . comes up against its
ideological limits" when confronting child abuse, because "[i]t sees the problem as being rooted
exclusively in the patriarchy, in the male exertion of power. The simplification leaves many questions
unasked. Perhaps it is too early to ask these questions since they would threaten the image of the
idealized mother." ALICE MILLER, BANISHED KNOWLEDGE: FACING CHILDHOOD INJURIES 76-77
(Leila Vennewitz trans., 1990).
86.
See, e.g., Emily Buss, What the Law Should (andShould Not) Learn from ChildDevelopment
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 22-24 (2009) (observing that parents may feel more committed to
their responsibility if they are granted autonomy in child rearing decisions); see generally Hasday,
ParenthoodDivided, supra note 7, at 328-56 (describing interventionist legal regime for poor and
working-class families); Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637
(2006) (arguing that rights-based approach to welfare determinations harms both parents and children).
87.
See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH L. REV.
1207, 1221 (1999); see also Huntington, supra note 86, at 646 (noting that scholars supporting parental
rights assert that protection from state intervention "safeguards cultural and moral diversity in matters
of childrearing by ensuring the state does not impose a uniform view of parenting").
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that mothers' interests and children's interests align. There appears to be a
consistent, though tacit, assumption that women (but not necessarily men)
are by nature decent and non-violent, if not universally maternal.88
Women's violence is either due to individual deviance ("bad mothers"), or
to overwhelming situational stress.89
Reva Siegel's canonical feminist critique of inter-spousal immunity,
"The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, adheres to
this gendered-centered critical perspective on domestic violence. 90 In "The
Rule of Love," Siegel persuasively attacks courts' invocation of family
privacy to preserve male hegemony by barring women from using their
post-coverture legal powers to sue their husbands in tort for harms arising
from physical abuse. 91 Siegel demonstrates that courts purported to respect
the new legal rights of women and to pity their physical abuse, yet barred
their suits nevertheless "based upon public policy" because "[to hear tort
claims between spouses] would tend to invade the holy sanctity of the
home and shatter the sacred relations between husband and wife." 92 To
Siegel, violence against women is the central harm of intra-family
immunity. In "The Rule of Love, " women are the victims-of male
violence, male judges, and patriarchal privacy discourse. 9 3
The parental immunity cases undermine this rigid gender dichotomy.
The judicial privacy discourse Siegel identifies is a precise analog to the
discourse in early parent-child cases, and the two immunities emerged
during the same period and were often discussed in tandem. However, in

88.

See CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR CHILDREN 103

(2001) (examining "the underpinnings of how seemingly loving and caring mothers kill their children
through neglect").
89.
Meyer and Oberman categorize some forms of filicide as "neglect-commission," a term that
removes the intention and agency from the acts of women who, for example, smothered their children,
asphyxiated them by putting tissue in their mouths, or left them strapped in their car seats overnight
while partying in a motel. See id. at 103-16.
90.
See generally Siegel, supra note 10.
91.
See id. at 2164-68.
92.
Id. at 2167 (alteration in original) (quoting Fiedeer v. Fiedeer, 140 P. 1022, 1023 (Okla.
1914)). See also, e.g., Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304, 308 (1877) (without immunity "[t]he private
matters of the whole period of married existence might be exposed by [such] suits"); Longendyke v.
Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366, 368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863) (lawsuit by wife would "sow the seeds of
perpetual domestic discord and broil"); id. (suit would be "destructive of that conjugal union and
tranquility, which it has always been the object of the law to guard and protect"); Thompson v.
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910) (rejecting woman's suit against her husband for assault and
battery as a "revolutionary" idea that would "thus emphasiz[e] and publish[] differences which
otherwise might not be serious"); Drake v. Drake, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (Minn. 1920) (suit against
husband would disrupt "the welfare of the home, the abiding place of domestic love and affection, the
maintenance of which in all its sacredness, undisturbed by a public exposure of trivial family
disagreements, is so essential to society").
93.
Siegel, supra note 10, at 2180-81 (noting that nineteenth-century judges were "far more
likely to appreciate the benefits of the tort immunity rule (to propertied husbands) than to register its
costs (to battered wives)").
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parental immunity cases women play a quite different role. From the first
parental immunity case in 1891, women-like men-used privacy as a
sword. Hewellette v. George, the grandparent of parent-child immunity
cases, involved an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of a daughter who
sued her mother for falsely imprisoning her in an insane asylum.9 4 And in
McKelvey v. McKelvey, the next case to impose immunity, the plaintiff
sued her father and stepmother for "cruel and inhumane treatment" by the
stepmother, which occurred with the father's passive consent.9 5 Since that
time, parental immunity has protected parents of both genders from acts
that would be tortious, or criminal, if perpetrated by others.96 Women are
victims, but also beneficiaries, of family privacy.
The absence of children from feminist critiques has had practical
implications. Feminist criticisms and the women's rights movement more
broadly have fueled inter-spousal immunity's demise.97 In contrast,
parental immunity (un-criticized, but suffering the same infirmities) has
settled more deeply into the common law. Yet feminists' privacy concerns
are magnified in the case of children, the most vulnerable family members.
As child advocacy scholar Barbara Bennett Woodhouse observes, even a
redefined family privacy (one that seems to exclude men) "invites us to
sweep under the rug the hardest cases-those in which the individual
interests of family members are in conflict." 98
This Article does not adopt MacKinnon's view that families must
entirely "explode" the private in order to obviate abuse against children.
Yet courts should be wary of granting special no-duty benefits to
individuals based on familial status. Although courts are motivated by a
desire to refrain from family interference, granting such protections

94.
See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891). In Hewellette, the legal argument protected
the plaintiffs mother, but the mother herself had died prior to the court's decision, so the suit was
against her estate.
95.
See McKelvey v. McKelvey, 77 S.W. 664 (Tenn. 1903).
96.
See, e.g., Newman v. Cole, 872 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 2003) (abrogating immunity to allow
wrongful death suit to proceed against father and stepmother where father held sixteen-year-old down
in choke hold while stepmother sprayed face with garden hose); Treschman v. Treschman, 61 N.E. 961,
962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1901) (recognizing immunity where stepmother knocked daughter unconscious
against a brick wall, but holding that it did not apply to the plaintiffs stepmother after her divorce from
the plaintiffs father); Dix v. Martin, 157 S.W. 133, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913) (adoptive mother tied
eight-year-old girl's hands and feet, then beat her with buggy whip); Gillett v. Gillett, 335 P.2d 736
(Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (girl's spleen and kidney removed because of internal bleeding after beating by
stepmother; court refused to apply immunity); Kelly v. Kelly, 155 S.E. 888 (S.C. 1930) (car accident).
97.
See Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of InterspousalImmunity, 60 MONT. L. REv. 101, 102
(1999) (tying the abrogation and abolition of inter-spousal immunity to women's rights movements).
98.
See Woodhouse, supra note 14, at 1257; see also Suzanne Kim, Reconstructing Family
Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 596-97 (2006) (agreeing in theory with impulse to detach privacy from
its gendered origins and protect caregiver-child relationships, but questioning whether this
reconstructed privacy theory is sufficiently protective of children).
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exemplifies precisely such interference.99 When a family member
affirmatively requests state intervention in a way that the law would allow
in the absence of a family relationship, then whether that involves
responding to a domestic violence call or allowing a lawsuit, the state
should not withhold intervention in the absence of a careful balancing of
the rights and interests at stake. Abstract privacy theory-whether by
scholars, by law enforcement, or by courts-frequently overlooks this step.
Close analysis of intra-family lawsuits demonstrates that parents should not
be immunized from liability for harm to their children, but should be held
to the same standard of reasonable care as other alleged tortfeasors.
II. NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION:
A LIMITED PARENTAL DUTY OF CONTROL
Among the few scholars who have addressed parental immunity, none
have simultaneously analyzed the other primary form of common law
parental liability-liability of parents for harms committed by their
children against others. The two forms of liability are treated, by scholars
and by courts, as wholly distinct. The inquiry is identical in many senses:
How far should reasonable parental responsibility to supervise children
extend? Yet the justifications for minimizing parents' liability are premised
on sharply contradictory narratives. As discussed above, the parental
immunity doctrine is premised on a view that parents exercise authority and
control over their children. Under this view, which echoes patriarchal
concepts of children as parental property and constitutional assertions of
parental rights, children are cocooned with the family unit, protected by
their parents' superior intellect and judgment. 00 However, cases in which
third parties seek to hold parents liable for harms that result from their
negligent supervision of their children evoke a strikingly different parentchild paradigm, according to which parents have very limited control over
their children. "That is my child and I know best how to handle her!" in
parent-child suits becomes "I have no idea what my child is doing and I
cannot control her!" when children harm others.
Like parental immunity, negligent supervision has been overlooked in
family and tort law scholarship. From a family law perspective, this may be
attributable to the doctrinal nature of negligent supervision analysis. The
parental immunity doctrine involves notions of duty in tort law, but it is
99.
Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, PunishingFamily Status, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1327, 1341-43 (2008) (critiquing criminal laws based on family status, including parental liability
laws).
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (holding that "[tihe law's concept of the
100.
family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions").
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predominantly a question of public policy. Negligent supervision doctrine,
in contrast, is inextricably linked to case-specific findings of duty,
foreseeability, and proximate cause-tort concepts that may appear
subsidiary to family law scholars' agendas. Yet tort scholars, too, have paid
scant attention to negligent parental supervision.
This neglect is unwarranted. First, as with suits by children against
their own parents, negligent supervision suits are commonplace and affect
large numbers of families and victims. 0o More broadly, negligent
supervision implicates important questions of negligence law, including the
scope of affirmative duties and the relationship between judge and jury.
Subpart A traces the nineteenth-century roots of common law claims of
negligent supervision. Subpart B demonstrates how courts, bolstered by the
first two Restatements of Torts, have used concepts of foreseeability in duty
to prevent juries from assessing parental supervision.
A. History ofNegligent Supervision: Limited Duty
The common law has long recognized that parents and children are in a
special relationship that entails affirmative parental responsibilities. 102Yet
negligent supervision cases, like parent-child cases, evince longstanding
judicial reluctance to allow juries to evaluate parents' failure to meet those
responsibilities. Negligent supervision cases implicate difficult questions
about the scope of affirmative duties to third parties. 0 3 They also implicate
difficult cultural questions about whether nurture or nature determines
children's behavioral propensities.1 0 4 The common law has never followed
the example of other nations (and two states) that impose strict liability on
parents for children's tortious conduct. 05 In the United States, children are
treated as independent agents.

101.
See, e.g., Buono v. Scalia, 817 A.2d 400 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (suit by third-party
against parent for negligent supervision); Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497 (Wash. 2008) (suit by child
against parent for negligent supervision).
102.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 316

(1934) ("Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of

Child").
103.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1963) (stating that in the absence of a special
relationship, "[t]here is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another"); Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic
Gain as a Suspect Motive, 41 VAND. L. REV. 63, 75 (1988) (explaining "the no-duty rule"); Robert L.
Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999) (describing controversy surrounding the
perceived expansion of liability to passive defendants such as gun manufacturers that have enabled
others to commit tortious harms).
104.
See generally JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN
OUT THE WAY THEY DO (1998) (arguing that nurture plays a smaller role than is assumed by

mainstream literature).
One notable exception is the "family purpose doctrine," which exposes parents (as car
105.
owners) to liability for harm caused by other family members using the car for non-business purposes.
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The limited nature of parental liability likely stems in part from tort
law's strong resistance to liability in the absence of fault.'06 But it also
reflects different standards of parenting that prevailed until well into the
nineteenth century, according to which parenting happened in the
interstices of productive household labor.107 The common practice in
England and colonial United States of apprenticing children out meant that
children were routinely living out of the house under the supervision of
other adults before age ten. 08 Moreover, due to continuing high birth rates
and declining child mortality rates, parents had many children to contend
with.109 In this context, it is not surprising that from a very young age,
children were viewed as autonomous actors in society, responsible-albeit
sometimes under a modified standard-for their own actions. With the
advent of adolescence as a transitional life stage, parenting practices began
to change. However, even once nineteenth-century prescriptive literature
proclaimed an ideal of mother-centered, emotive parenting, most
Americans could not afford to pursue that ideal."10 The modem common
law framework for parental liability for negligent supervision was
established under nineteenth-century, authoritarian parenting traditions.
In the absence of strict liability, fathers in the nineteenth century (all
the early cases were against fathers as head of household) were subject to
liability for their children's torts only in rare situations where the harm
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §340, at 935 (2001) (explaining that "the doctrine represents a
social policy generated in response to the problem presented by massive use of the automobile").
Alone among the states, Hawaii and Louisiana hold parents strictly liable for their children's torts.
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (2009) ("The father and the mother are responsible for the damage
occasioned by their minor child, who resides with them or who has been placed by them under the care
of other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons."); HAW. REV. STAT § 577-3 (1984)
(parents jointly and severally liable for tortious acts committed by their children).
Other nations have taken a different approach to parental liability questions. In France, for
example, parents are "strictly and automatically liable" for harm caused by the acts of minor dependent
children; the acts or omissions of the parents are irrelevant. L. Francoz-Terminal, F. Lafay, 0. Moreteau
& C. Pellerin-Rutigliano, Children as Tortfeasors Under French Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW,
PART 1: CHILDREN AS TORTFEASORS 169, 193-94 (Miquel Martin-Casals ed., 2006) [hereinafter
CHILDREN IN TORT LAW]. In other nations, parents are presumptively liable for harmful acts committed
by their children, but parents may rebut that presumption by proving they acted reasonably. Pieter de

Tavernier, Children as Tortfeasors Under Belgian Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, supra, at 63, 85;
Jifi Hridek, Children as Tortfeasors Under Czech Law, in CHILDREN INTORT LAW, supra,at 111, 128;
Gerhard Wagner, Children as Tortfeasors Under German Law, in CHILDREN IN TORT LAW, supra, at

217, 235.
106.
See Robert L. Rabin, The HistoricalDevelopment ofthe Fault Principle:A Reinterpretation,
15 GA. L. REv. 925, 928 (1981) (stating that "fault liability emerged out of a world-view dominated
largely by no-liability thinking").
107.
MINTZ & KELLOGG, supra note 25, at 45.

Id. at 16.
108.
Birth rates went down gradually over the nineteenth century. See id. at 51 (stating that at the
109.
outset of the nineteenth century most women had seven or eight children; by mid-century, that number
had reduced to five or six; and by the turn of the twentieth century the norm was three to four).
See id.
110.
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could be traced to a father's independently negligent act."' Thus, fathers
could be liable for directing, authorizing, or ratifying a child's tortious
conduct, or if the child committed the tort while in the father's employ.1 12
Fathers were also held liable for negligently entrusting a child with a gun or
other dangerous instrumentality.' 13 These forms of liability were not
peculiar to the parent-child relationship; they were applications of more
general principles of agency and negligent entrustment. 114 For example, in
Beedy v. Reding, the court affirmed a jury verdict against a father based on
an inference that he must have been aware that his sons used his sleigh to
haul off a neighbor's wood on three occasions."' Similarly, in Hoverson v.
Noker, a father was held liable when his children repeatedly yelled and shot
guns toward passersby:
If the father permitted his young sons to shout, use abusive
language, and discharge fire-arms at persons who were passing
along the highway in front of his house, he permitted that to be
done upon his premises which, in its nature, was likely to result in
damage to those passing, and when an injury did happen from that
cause he was not only morally but legally responsible for the

damage done."16
By failing to take action, the fathers in Beedy and Hoverson were
deemed to have ratified or authorized their sons' unlawful conduct. In
contrast, a court held a father not liable as a matter of law for his children's
shooting of a neighbor's mules, on the ground that the father had not
"counseled or abetted" his sons or "concealed the offense."" 7
None of the early cases premised liability on the father's ex ante failure
to instruct his children in proper conduct. Parental liability involved a duty
to exert immediate, physical control over one's child in situations as they
See Chandler v. Deaton, 37 Tex. 406, 407 (1873) (finding "no presumption growing out of
111.
the domestic relation of parent and child, which would hold the father responsible for a crime or a tort
committed by his minor child, unless it be shown that the father is himself in some way implicated as
principal or accessory").
112.
See, e.g., Teagarden v. McLaughlin, 86 Ind. 476 (1882) (holding that father could not use
independent contractor defense when he paid son to clear plaintiffs land and son negligently set fire
while performing the work); Altoonian v. Muldonian, 177 N.E. 830 (Mass. 1931) (holding storeowner
father liable for harm caused by son making deliveries by bicycle).
113.
See, e.g., Meers v. McDowell, 62 S.W. 1013 (Ky. 1901); Johnson v. Glidden, 76 N.W. 933
(N.D. 1898).
114.
Adults other than parents were held liable for entrusting children with firearms or
ammunition. See, e.g., Binford v. Johnston, 82 Ind. 426 (1882) (shop owner).
115.
Beedy v. Reding, 16 Me. 362 (1839).

116.

Hoverson v. Noker, 19 N.W. 382, 382 (Wis. 1884).

117.
Chandler v. Deaton, 37 Tex. 406, 407 (1883). The court was not even certain that
concealment would be sufficient for liability. Id. The question whether the father negligently entrusted
firearms to his children was not before the court.

2013]1

Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent

557

arose. In all other situations, children bore sole liability for their torts. 18
Published in 1934, § 316 of the first Restatement reflects this early but
limited recognition of parental liability. The title of the Restatement
provision-"Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child"-somewhat
oversells the narrow duty it imposes:
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others or
from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to them, if the parent
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to
control his child, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control. 19
The commentary to § 316 denoted fathers "head[s] of the family
group," extending a supervisory duty to mothers only "in so far as [their]
position as mother[s] gives [them] an ability to control" their children.1 2 0
The provision's comments emphasize early courts' holdings that the duty
to control does not hinge upon the quality of a parent's child rearing
practices:
The duty of a parent is only to exercise such ability to control
his child as he in fact has at the time when he has the opportunity
to exercise it and knows the necessity of so doing. The parent is not
under a duty so to discipline his child as to make it amenable to
parental control when its exercise becomes necessary to the safety

of others.12 1
Thus, the Restatement reflects the very limited view of parental
responsibility-primarily paternal responsibility-from early case law.
Although the lines between different forms of parental liability frequently
blur, courts now delineate four categories of parental liability: (1)
principal/agent liability, where a parent mandates, encourages or ratifies a
child's tortious conduct; (2) respondeat superior liability, where the child is
employed by the parent; (3) negligent entrustment, where a parent entrusts
a child with a dangerous instrumentality; and (4) negligent supervision
under § 316, where a parent's failure to control a child's conduct exposes

118.
See, e.g., Lessoff v. Gordon, 124 S.W. 182 (Tex. 1909) (holding a father not liable for son's
independent decision to attempt to recapture escaped cow).
119.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

120.
121.

Id.§ 316 cmt. a.
Id. § 316 cmt. b.

§ 316 (1934).

Alabama Law Review

558

[Vol. 64:3:533

third parties to an unreasonable risk of harm.122 However, § 316's narrow
definition of parental duty confined liability primarily to the types of
situations in the first three categories, in accordance with nineteenthcentury beliefs about the limited role of parents in controlling a child's
conduct.
B. Modern Limits on Duty: The DangerousPropensityRequirement
In the early common law, children were typically solely responsible for
their tortious conduct. To a great extent, this allocation of responsibility
toward children, even very young children, and away from parents,
continues today. 12 3 Common law liability for negligent supervision has
remained essentially the same since the time of the first Restatement. In
1965, the second Restatement republished § 316 verbatim. Thus, over the
past seventy-five years, courts have leaned strongly toward finding no
liability as a matter of law based on their interpretation of the
Restatement's formulation of parental duty to control. 12 4
Foreseeability has provided the primary mechanism for determining
(and narrowing) the contours of parental duty for negligent supervision.
Perhaps because of § 316's awkward language, courts developed this
foreseeability standard based not on the language of the provision itself, but
on a sentence in the Reporter's Notes to the Restatement (Second), stating
that "[t]here must . .. be some specific propensity of the child, of which the
parent has notice."l 25 Many courts have interpreted this sentence literally,
holding that a child's misconduct is not foreseeable-and therefore parents
122.

See Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43

YALE L. J. 886 (1934).

A few recent cases reaffirm the traditional view that even very young children are capable of
123.
committing intentional torts. See Weisbart v. Flohr, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (seven-yearold had intent to shoot five-year-old in the eye with arrow); Bailey v. C.S., 12 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.
2000) (four-year-old could be liable for crushing babysitter's larynx).
In negligence, children are held to the standard of others of like age, intelligence and maturity, or
to the adult standard if they engage in a dangerous adult activity. See, e.g., Midwestern Indemnity Co.
v. Wiser, 760 N.E.2d 62 (Ohio App. 2001) (child with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder not held
to same standard as average eight-year-old). A minority of states impose age-based presumptions:
Children older than fourteen are presumptively capable of negligence; there is a rebuttable presumption
that children between seven and fourteen lack the capacity to commit negligence; and children under
seven are incapable of negligence. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &

EMOTIONAL HARM § 10(c) cmt b. (2010). The Restatement (Third)would eliminate negligence liability
for children under five. Id. § 10(b) cmt. d. There are no known examples of children under the age of
eleven being held to an adult standard of care. Id.
See Crisafulli v. Bass Auction Co., 38 P.3d 842, 846 (Mont. 2001) (adopting § 316 in case
124.
where boy/employee rode bicycle into spectator at auction, but noting that it imposes liability in
"limited and exceptional circumstances").
125.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 316

reporter's note (1965). The Reporters also

restated the maxim that "[t]here is no 'general responsibility for the rearing of incorrigible children."'
Id.
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have no duty to supervise as a matter of law-until a child has displayed a
"dangerous propensity" for that particular type of misconduct. 126
The "dangerous propensity" standard has fueled a steady stream of
judicial no-duty determinations. At its extremes, it has yielded ridiculous
results. For example, in Fuller v. Studer, the court found no parental duty
where a three-year-old girl climbed onto a snowmobile that her father had
left running and pulled the throttle, causing it to run over an embankment
and land on another child.12 7 The court ruled as a matter of law that the
father had no duty to third parties to prevent his daughter from driving
away on the snowmobile because plaintiffs had failed to show that the girl
had a known propensity to climb or play upon a snowmobile. 12 8 The court
did not allow a jury to consider whether parents might expect a typical
three-year-old to be intrigued by or climb upon a motorized vehicle.
Courts requiring proof of a child's dangerous propensity have also
required a precise correlation between past misconduct and the child's
current misconduct to trigger parental duty based on dangerous propensity.
In Saenz v. Andrus, a boy threw a butcher knife left on a counter at another
child while they were at the boy's home unattended after school. In
rejecting liability for the mother, the court found that the son's known
proclivity for throwing pocket knives at walls was-as a matter of lawirrelevant to the question of whether it was foreseeable that he might throw
a butcher knife at or near another child.129 Analogously, in Manuel v.
Koonce, a sixteen-year-old hosted an alcohol-infused party when his
parents went away for a weekend, resulting in a fatal drunk-driving
accident.13 Based on the parents' testimony that their son had never
consumed alcohol at their home before, the court ruled that the parents had
no duty to anticipate the debauchery, despite the boy's previous conviction
after a jury trial for an alcohol-related offense for which he was still on
probation at the time of the party, as well as testimony that he routinely
came home drunk.' 3 1 Other courts have made similarly tortured no-duty
determinations on the grounds that, in the absence of a specific propensity,
a child's conduct was not foreseeable and the parent thus had no duty to

126.
See Fuller v. Studer, 833 P.2d 109 (Idaho 1992); Saenz v. Andrus, 393 S.E.2d 724 (Ga. App.
1990).
127.
See Fuller, 833 P.2d at 114 n.3 (Bistline, J., dissenting) (quoting affidavit stating that "(tlhe
kids were standing around in various places. I don't know if we said anything to them about staying
away from the machine. Both of our backs were to my snowmobile when Barbara, aged 3 at that time,
somehow climbed onto my machine.").
128.
See id. at 113 (finding no disputed issue of material fact where "[b]oth affiants stated that
they were unaware of any propensity of Barbara to climb upon and play on a snowmobile.").
129.
Saenz v. Andrus, 393 S.E.2d at 726 (Ga. App. 1990).
130.
See Manuel v. Koonce, 425 S.E.2d 921 (Ga. App. 1992).
131.
Id. at 923, 926 (McMurray, J., dissenting).
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exercise control. 13 2 Furthermore, privilege issues have complicated
plaintiffs' proof of propensity by prohibiting introduction of juvenile
convictions to demonstrate propensity. 13 3
Another limitation of the dangerous propensity test is that it focuses
solely on the behavioral propensities of the parent's child as an individual,
although-predictably-children act differently among peers. The parents
in Koonce gave their son permission to have a slumber party while they
were away, but the court's analysis of the son's behavior did not consider
the possibility that it might be affected by teen group dynamics.134
Similarly, in Kitchens v. Harris, the defendant's mother informed the
plaintiffs parents that she would be home during a birthday party for her
fourteen-year-old daughter.'3 5 As it turns out, the birthday girl's parents left
the house during the party.1 While they were gone, the girls took out the
family's ATV, and the plaintiff was severely injured when one of the girls
drove it into a tree.13 7 The court found no parental duty because of a lack of
evidence that the daughter had a propensity to use the ATV without
permission, or to allow others to do so.13 8 The court did not consider the
impact of the other girls on the duty to supervise, either by considering
their behavioral propensities or by considering how the girls' behavior and
judgment might alter within a group.' 39 A finding of no duty based on a

See, e.g, Nearor v. Davis, 694 N.E.2d 120 (Ohio 1997) (child's use of loaded revolver left
132.
under mattress to shoot friend not foreseeable despite previous arrest, school disciplinary infractions for
drugs, history of lying to parents, and prior theft of parent's car keys to drive without a license);
Polizzoti v. Gomes, 2006 Mass. App. Div. 40 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2006) (two traffic citations not sufficient
to show minor's dangerous propensity for negligent motorcycle driving); Jackson v. Wimbley, 463
S.E.2d 48 (Ga. App. 1995) (no liability without known proclivity of four-year-old child to play with
fire); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Freschi, 393 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. App. 1965) (three-year-old lacked
dangerous propensity to get in trucks and pull parking brakes); Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So. 2d 701
(1955) (eight-year-old's propensity for striking or knocking down furniture not sufficient to render
slamming of door foreseeable). In Haefele v. Phillips, No. 90AP-1331, 1991 WL 64896, at *2 (Ohio Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 1991), the court stated:
[W]e find a complete lack of evidence that Matthew's prior behavior would have given
defendant reasonable cause to believe that Matthew would viciously stab another child with
a knife. Construing the affidavits most strongly in their favor, plaintiffs can, at best, establish
that Matthew drank beer . .. struck his mother and threatened his father on one occasion, and
had a deep and consuming interest in 'marine gear' such that he possessed several combat
knives.. . . [T]his is not the quality of notice required to establish foreseeability sufficient to
hold a parent liable for the acts of a child.
See, e.g., Parmett v. Superior Ct., 262 Cal. Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (plaintiff may not
133.
obtain information or testimony about sealed juvenile court proceedings to show dangerous propensity).
See Manuel v. Koonce, 425 S.E.2d 921, 922 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
134.
See Kitchens v. Harris, 701 S.E.2d 207, 209 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010).
135.
Id. at 208.
136.
Id.
137.
Id. at 209 (finding that in the absence of a propensity of the girl "for the specific dangerous
138.
activity, [the mother] was not required to keep a constant watch to guard against possible harm").
Id.
139.
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lack of a child's dangerous propensity "is the most common conclusion to
this sort of claim."l 40
C. Modern Limits on Duty: No Opportunity to Control
Finally, many courts hold, based on the Restatement, that parents have
no duty under § 316 because even if they know of their child's dangerous
propensities, they had no "opportunity for exercising such control" at the
time of the misconduct.14 1 In some cases these decisions define control in a
very narrow, physical sense: If the parent is not present, there is no duty,
regardless of whether the parent's actions might have created the risk of
harm.142 Adhering to the narrow view of parental liability in early case law,
the few courts upholding a finding of liability typically do so on the basis
that the parent either ratified or encouraged the child's pattern of tortious
behavior. 143
Frequently these no-duty determinations reflect an instrumentalist
unwillingness to impose liability on parents for acts of teenagers who
commit serious crimes. In Barth v. Massa, a fifteen-year-old boy shot a
police officer with a stolen gun during a nighttime burglary. 14 4 The
appellate court overturned a jury verdict against the boy's parents, finding
they had no duty because they had no opportunity to prevent the
burglary.14 5 The evidence included testimony of multiple incidents in the
months before the burglary of the boy shooting at other children in the
neighborhood with BB or pellet guns.14 6 The police contacted the parents
regarding the incidents, but the parents did not take away the boy's guns or
follow the suggestions of the police for counseling.147 The jury also heard

140.

Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 981 n.13 (Alaska 1999).

141.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 316(b)

(1965).

See also, e.g., Propst v. Farnsworth, No. I CA-CV 09-0355, 2010 WL 3596740, at *3 (Ariz.
142.
Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2010) (father who told six-year-old child to microwave his own dinner and then left
house had no opportunity to control child when he spilled extremely hot food on infant cousin). Courts
may properly find no negligence as a matter of law if there is no feasible means for parents to take
precautions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Meyer, 365 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (no liability for son's
attack on person who arrived unexpectedly at house while father was out) (cited approvingly in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 41 reporters' note (Final Draft No. 1, 2005)).
143.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Glidden, 76 N.W. 933 (S.D. 1898) (liability appropriate where father
gave son gun and consented to son's negligent use of it); Condel v. Savo, 39 A.2d 51 (Pa. 1944)
(parents knew their child assaulted smaller children and resisted admonitions of other adults about his
conduct); Norton v. Payne, 281 P. 991 (Wash. 1929) (parents encouraged son to strike other children
with sticks); Sun Mountain Prods., Inc. v. Pierre, 929 P.2d 494 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (evidence
showed father was aware of, but did not take action regarding, stockpile of stolen car stereo goods in
son's room).
144.
See Barth v. Massa, 558 N.E.2d 528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
145.
Id. at 534.
146.
Id. at 531.
147.
Id. at 531-32.
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evidence that the boy's father had secretly removed guns from his son's
room following the boy's arrest.14 8 The court ruled that this evidence was
not sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant parents had any knowledge
of or opportunity to prevent their son's crime. 149 Other decisions follow this
general approach, finding even the most minimal efforts by parents to deal
with a child's dangerous propensity sufficient to support a no-duty
determination. 5 o Courts appear to use fact-intensive no-duty findings in
these cases to minimize parental liability for children with chronic
behavioral problems who commit serious crimes.
However, of the few cases that do find a parental duty, some raise
instrumentalist concerns that tip the other way, reflecting current societal
fears and mores. For example, in Nieuwendorp v. American Family
Insurance Company, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld a jury verdict
holding parents liable for their fourth grade son's assault on a teacher when
the parents had failed to warn his school that they had taken the boy off
medication for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.' 5 1 The court clarified
that the decision not to give the child medication was not itself negligent; it
was the manner in which the parents implemented their decision, and their
failure to inform the school, that exposed others to an unreasonable risk of
harm.152 But the line between nonfeasance and misfeasance easily blurs if,
for example, parents fail to have their child evaluated despite clear signs of
mental illness that could have been mitigated or resolved through
medication; or if parents fail to supervise the child to ensure that he
regularly takes such medication.' 5 3
Failure to warn cases have also arisen in the slightly different context
where parents do not inform others of their child's past sexual
misconduct.154 In these latter cases, courts have found liability only where
the history of sexual misconduct was clear and where the victim was
148.
Id. at 532.
149.
Id. at 534-35.
See Dinsmore-Poff v. Alvord, 972 P.2d 978, 983 (Alaska 1999) (case law does not support
150.
"searching inquiry into alternate disciplinary regimes" where older children commit serious crimes); see
also KEETON ET AL., supra note 38, § 124, at 915 ("[1]t would be extending the hardships of harassed
and exasperated parents too far to hold them liable for general incorrigibility, a bad education and
upbringing, or the fact that the child turns out to have a nasty disposition.").
See Nieuwendorp v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1995).
151.
152.
Id. at 596.
See, e.g., L.C. v. Cent. Penn. Youth Ballet, No. 1:09-cv-2076, 2010 WL 2650640, at *5
153.
(M.D. Pa. Jul. 2, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss negligent supervision claim where parents knew that
son needed medication to control his behavior and failed to provide it to him, and son sexually assaulted
plaintiff at dance school).
See Doe v. Kahrs, 662 N.E.2d 101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding parents subject to liability
154.
for negligent supervision although they were not home at the time when they were aware that one of
their sons had previous history of inappropriate sexual misconduct); Isbell v. Ryan, 983 S.W.2d 335
(Tex. App. 1998) (finding mother could be liable for failure to inform her ex-husband's wife that son
might pose a danger to stepmother's daughter based on history of son's sexual molestation of cousin).
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immediately foreseeable-for example, where the victim was playing
unsupervised at the perpetrator's house. 55 But one can envision a troubling
expansion of such holdings, requiring parents to warn schools, church
groups, and the neighborhood in general of their child's potential sexual
deviance. Finally, some (but by no means all) courts have recently
expanded liability for negligent supervision by imposing a duty of
supervision on parents of adult children with mental disabilities who
continue to reside with their parents.156 Foreseeability allows courts to
restrict parents' duty to supervise, but it also provides a mechanism for
expanding its scope.
D. Giving Foreseeabilityto the Jury
Section 316 has not provided courts with a consistent, workable
standard by which to evaluate parental actions. Courts have used the
"dangerous propensity" requirement to calibrate parents' duty based on
judges' assessments of the merits of individual cases rather than allowing a
jury to assess breach and proximate cause. In addition, courts' no-duty
findings frequently, though tacitly, reflect instrumentalist policy concerns
about the impact of imposing parental liability. The dangerous propensity
requirement does not differentiate between parents' duty to closely
supervise young children-like a three-year-old near a snowmobile, or an
eight-year-old who is throwing furniture in a hotel-and the different
considerations inherent to parents' supervisory relationship with teens. In
addition, by focusing on the individual child's behaviors in isolation, the
dangerous propensity requirement fails to account for foreseeable changes
in children's judgment and behavior in group situations. Finally, courts

See, e.g., Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906, 912 (Wis. 2000) (recognizing negligent
155.
supervision claim arising out of sexual assault on four-year-old plaintiff by ten-year-old neighbor with
history of sexually inappropriate conduct but denying claim for negligent failure to warn on public
policy grounds).
See, e.g., Silberstein v. Cordie, 474 N.W.2d 850, 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (denying
156.
summary judgment against parents of twenty-seven-year-old man with child-like mental abilities);
Mayeux v. Madden, 520 So. 2d 1005 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding parents could be liable for failure to
control adult son with schizophrenia who was living with them, but granting summary judgment
because son had not displayed propensity for violence); R.H. v. Mischenko, No. L-2373-06, 2011 WL
2320844 (N.J. Sup. Ct. June 3, 2011) (finding no duty to supervise adult, heroin-addicted daughter to
prevent assaults on daughter's four-year-old therapy client because violence was not foreseeable);
Frederic v. Willoughby, No. 2007-P-0084, 2008 WL 2582593, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 2008)
(finding a genuine issue of fact as to parents' failure to control adult son who sexually assaulted
neighbor). But see, e.g., Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 578 A.2d 1048 (Conn. 1990) (parents of adult
son with schizophrenia owed no duty to control). Recently a wrongful death suit based on a failure to
warn was filed against the parents and grandmother of an adult law firm partner who pleaded guilty to
murdering a colleague's ex-wife. See John Council, Family Responsibilities? Wrongful Death Suit Filed
Against Criminal Defendant's Parents, Grandmother, TEXAS LAWYER (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/PubArticleTXjsp?id=1202539298845&sretum=1.
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sometimes seem to require that the parents actually know of their child's
dangerous propensity, rather than triggering parental duty when they
should know. Therefore, parents' denial about their child's drinking
problem, for example, might insulate them from liability.
Under § 316 courts also shoehorn proximate cause into no-duty
analyses. Frequently courts do this in situations where older children have
committed serious or criminal acts; courts are hesitant to ascribe liability
for such conduct to parents. In some cases a court's no-duty determination
is in fact a finding of no breach or no proximate cause as a matter of law. In
other instances, however, a reasonable jury could find those elements; the
court's no-duty determination is influenced-though quietly-by public
policy concerns or, simply, antipathy to parental negligent supervision as a
cause of action. In the negligent supervision half of the parental liability
universe, as in the parental immunity half, the common law has taken a dim
view of parental liability. As the next Parts demonstrate, courts should
refrain from calibrating duty precisely to individual cases and instead
impose on parents a consistent standard of reasonable care in negligent
supervision cases.
III. THE RESTA TEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
ALLOWING JURIES TO JUDGE PARENTS

The question whether to impose-or withhold-negligence liability is
essentially one of policy.15 7 In the realm of parental liability, these policy
determinations are fraught with competing visions of which entities deserve
protection as families, how the members of those families should be
ordered, and the relation of the family to the state.158
Yet parental liability is also deeply affected by broader trends in
negligence law, particularly those trends that have to do with the allocation
of decisional power between the judge and the fact finder. On this front,
too, a battle is waged, and until now, judges have won: Judges have
aggressively shaped and narrowed the legal duties of parents with respect
to their children.1 59
The publication by the American Law Institute of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and EmotionalHarm-of which the
first volume was published in 2010 and the second in 2013-makes now a

157.

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 38,

§ 53

(describing duty as "only an expression . . . of

policy which lead[s] the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection").
See McCurdy, supra note 15, at 1030 ("Here is waged a battle between conflicting
158.
conceptions of the family, between individual and relational rights and duties.").
Robert L. Rabin, The Duty Concept in Negligence Law: A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787,
159.
793 (2001) ("Duty is, in other words, a two-sided coin that can reinforce status quo limitations or serve
dynamically expansive purposes.").
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particularly appropriate time to reconsider parental liability. While in
theory Restatements merely "restate" prevailing law, their actual role has
not been so limited: The prominent scholars and practitioners who draft the
Restatements often use the provisions in an attempt to influence or alter
common law norms.' 60 The Restatement (Third) is no exception. The
Restatement (Third)'s broader theory of duty in negligence, as well as its
specific approach to affirmative parental duty, reemphasizes the standard of
reasonable care and the centrality of the jury to negligence determinations.
If accepted by courts, these revisions, which seek to constrict judges'
increasing reliance on duty to decide cases as a matter of law, will deeply
influence the terms by which future parental-liability debates will be
decided. And those terms should be the traditional standard of reasonable
care.
A. Renewed Commitment to the StandardofReasonable Care
The Restatement (Third)'s approach to duty in negligence represents a
deceptively understated counterattack against the growing tendency of
judges to use duty to retain decisional power-precisely the kind of judicial
power retention that is at the heart of both forms of parental liability.'6 '
Section 7 states that when an actor's conduct creates a risk of physical
harm, the actor "ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care."' 62 This
statement is so obvious that the drafters considered omitting it entirely.163
Section 7(b), however, provides that courts should depart from this duty of
ordinary care only in "exceptional" cases, when "countervailing principle
or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of
cases." 64 Section 7(b)'s use of the word "exceptional" underscores a

160.
See Arthur L. Corbin, The Restatement of the Common Law by the American Law Institute,
15 IOWA L. REV. 19, 27 (1929).
See W. Jonathan Cardi, PurgingForeseeability: The New Vision of Judicial Power in the
161.
ProposedRestatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739, 741 (describing Restatement (Third)'s
duty provisions as "subtly revolutionary").
162.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§ 7(a)

(2010).
See John C. P. Goldberg, Introduction: The Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles
163.
and the John W Wade Conference, 54 VAND. L. REV. 639, 654 (2001) ("An actor has a legal
obligation, in the conduct of the actor's own affairs, to act reasonably to avoid causing legally
cognizable harm to another." (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

§ 101

(Preliminary Draft No. 2, 2000))); see also John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001)
(criticizing the proposed Restatement's omission of duty).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD): LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(b) (2010); id. § 7
164.
cmt. a ("When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case, the appropriate rubric is scope
of liability. On the other hand, when liability depends on factors applicable to categories of actors or
patterns of conduct, the appropriate rubric is duty. No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can
promulgate relatively clear, categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.").
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renewed commitment to the strong norm of reasonable care. Moreover,
§ 7(b) indicates that courts should only adjust duty based on policy
decisions across "a class of cases" rather than as part of an individualized
duty analysis. Section 7 must also be read in conjunction with § 8, which
states emphatically that analyses of breach and proximate cause are within
the province of the jury rather than the court.16 s The combined effect of
these provisions-as the Reporters acknowledge-is to drastically restrict
the role of a court in making duty determinations based on fact-specific

grounds.16 6
Section 7 reflects the Reporters' concern that courts, led by California,
have increasingly used legal duty analysis to constrict or expand
defendants' negligence duties in individual cases based on unstated and
perhaps inappropriate considerations. 167 While the principles it articulates
appear grounded in tradition, some scholars have argued that the
Restatement (Third) manipulates, rather than restates, the law of duty in
negligence.1 6 8 The long-term impact of § 7 is yet to be determined.
Its influence on parental liability cases is also unclear. For over a
century courts have granted parents immunity from liability on the ground
that the parent-child relationship (like the relationship of spouses, and the
relationship between a charity and its beneficiaries) is "exceptional" and
warrants establishment of a lower standard of care. In theory, therefore, this
provision is consistent with courts' across-the-board approach to parental
immunity. Nevertheless, as discussed further in Part IV, suits against
parents do not qualify as "exceptional" simply because the defendants (or
the third-party defendants who are subject to contribution claims) are
parents of the plaintiff. The evolution of parental liability, now riddled with
exceptions, bears this out. Moreover, among the many states that have
completely abolished parental immunity, there has been no judicial,
165.
See id. § 8(b).
166.
See id. § 7 reporters' note.
167.
See id. § 7 reporters' note, cmt. j (observing that "[t]he California Supreme Court has been
in the vanguard in suggesting that foreseeability has an important role to play in determining whether a
duty exists"); see also Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing "Duty, " 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265
(2006) (critiquing California's overuse of foreseeability). The California cases most associated with
California's foreseeability standard include Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (holding that
notary public owed affirmative duty to beneficiary of negligently prepared will); Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968) (relaxing the distinctions of duty of care for landowners and replacing
them with a single duty of reasonable care); and Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976) (finding that psychotherapists had duty to warn former girlfriend of patient's intent to harm
her).
See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening Wrongdoing in Tort: The
168.
Restatement (Third)'s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1211,
1212 (2009) (stating that "[iut is in our view inappropriate for a 'restatement' of the law to discard basic
tort concepts rather than, for example, to acknowledge them and criticize them in commentary"); see
generally W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671 (2008)
(analyzing relationship of duty debate to California tort law).
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scholarly, or public outcry. In accordance with the Restatement (Third),
parents should be held to a standard of reasonable care.
B. Giving ForeseeabilityBack to Juries
The most controversial aspect of the Restatement (Third)'s attempt to
constrain increasing judicial power in negligence is its forthright rejection
of foreseeability as an element of a judge's evaluation of legal duty.' 69 Over
the past few decades, duty has evolved into a more individualized, less
predictable inquiry. In the landmark California cases that ignited the
foreseeability fire, courts used foreseeability to expand defendants' duties
beyond common law norms. Nevertheless, foreseeability not only spread
beyond California, it also oozed out of difficult or unusual cases into
routine judicial duty determinations, so that "foreseeability now threatens
to swallow the duty calculus whole." 7 o Unquestionably foreseeability is
deeply entrenched in the modern judicial landscape. In one estimate
currently "forty-seven states plainly do give foreseeability a significant role
in duty analysis." 17 '
The Restatement (Third) seeks to reverse that trend, placing
foreseeability within the jury's purview:
Foreseeable risk is an element in the determination of negligence.
In order to determine whether appropriate care was exercised, the
factfinder must assess the foreseeable risk at the time of the
defendant's alleged negligence. The extent of foreseeable risk
depends on the specific facts of the case and cannot be usefully
assessed for a category of cases; small changes in the facts may
make a dramatic change in how much risk is foreseeable.' 72
The Reporters injected this provision into the commentary on § 7 at
almost the last moment, based on a law review article arguing that judges'
expanding, indiscriminate use of foreseeability usurps the jury's traditional

169.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7
cmt. j (2010) ("In order to determine whether appropriate care was exercised, the factfinder must assess
the foreseeable risk .... The extent of foreseeable risk depends on the specific facts of the case and
cannot be usefully assessed for a category of cases; small changes in the facts may make a dramatic
change in how much risk is foreseeable. Thus ... courts should leave such determinations to juries
unless no reasonable person could differ on the matter.").
W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability,46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 922 (2005).
170.
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeabilityin Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE
171.
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1260 (2009).

172.
(2010).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§7

cmt. j
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province. 173 Thus, the Restatement (Third) has answered the Palsgrafian
question, and the scales have tipped against Justice Cardozo.174
Although the Reporters rooted their rejection of foreseeability in
traditional tort law, some scholars have argued that rejecting foreseeability
is counter to common judicial practice as well as common sense.175 Other
scholars agree with the principle of the Restatement (Third), but argue that
courts must inevitably make case-specific duty determinations in some
instances. 176 It remains to be seen whether courts will embrace the
Restatement (Third)'s streamlined, foreseeability-free view of duty,
although there are early indications that they will. 7 7 Certainly it is
attractive. In addition to confronting systemic problems associated with
foreseeability, the Restatement (Third)'s approach at least gives the illusion
of simplicity.
For parents as defendants, the price of such simplicity-and of the
resulting increased jury participation-may be increased exposure to
liability. In negligent supervision suits, courts have used foreseeability in
duty to narrow parents' duties to supervise their children. Removing
foreseeability from that duty analysis will result in more suits surviving
dispositive motions and either proceeding to trial or, more likely, settling
on more favorable terms than the current framework allows.
Notwithstanding the Restatement (Third)'s commitment to reinvigorating
the role of juries in tort suits, however, courts will retain their traditional
prerogative to rule as a matter of law in favor of defendant parents if no

173.
See id. § 7 reporters' note, cmt. j (explaining the influence of Cardi's article Purging
Foreseeability, supra note 161, on the decision to explicitly remove foreseeability from duty
determinations); see Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, supra note 161, at 743 (arguing that "[i]n many
courts the foreseeability lens seems to expand, contract or change focus at the will of the judge"); see
also Twerski, The Cleaver,the Violin and the Scalpel: Duty andthe Restatement of Torts, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 22-23 (2008) (agreeing with Cardi and Green that foreseeability "is the exact type of factor that
belongs in the domain of the jury").
174.
See Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) ("The risk reasonably to
be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation . . . .").
175.
Zipursky, supra note 171, at 1258 (2009) (challenging the Restatement (Third)'s approach
on the ground that "almost every jurisdiction does treat foreseeability as a significant factor (and
frequently the most significant factor) in analyzing whether the duty element is met in a negligence
claim"); see also id. at n.47 (listing cases); Rabin, supra note 159, at 792 (2001) (observing ability of
judges to manipulate cases by treating questions of proximate cause or other factual questions as duty
questions).
176.
See Twerski, supra note 173, at 8-10.
177.
See A.W. v. Lancaster Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 913-14 (Neb. 2010) (abrogating
past framework and adopting approach of Restatement (Third)); Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d
906 (Wis. 2000) (applying standard of reasonable care and considering public policy in determining not
to impose duty to wam of child's potential for sexual misconduct); Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228
(Ariz. 2007) (same); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009); Behrendt v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2009). But see, e.g., Smith v. Freund, 192 Cal. App. 4th
466 (2011) (finding no duty of parents to control adult son based on lack of foreseeability of son's
shooting rampage).
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reasonable jury could find liability." 8 In addition, consistent with the
Restatement (Third), courts may still modify duty in parent-child cases
where "exceptional" concerns of principle and policy so require.' 7 9
C. The End of§ 316: A Revised Approach to ParentalDuty
Section 316 has dominated judicial analysis of negligent supervision
cases against parents since its publication in the first Restatement of Torts
in 1938. The original § 316 has never been modified. Yet not only have
prevailing parenting norms shifted over the past century, incorporating
society's increasing unwillingness to take risk, the common law has also
become more comfortable with imposing-and enforcing-affirmative tort
duties in other contexts.' 80 In addition, the rejection of foreseeability in
duty has far-reaching implications for all affirmative duty cases. It is hardly
surprising, therefore, that the forthcoming volume of the Restatement
(Third), which contains the provision addressing affirmative duties,
represents a rather significant shift from the views of previous
Restatements.
The Restatement (Second) addressed affirmative duties in a series of
provisions, establishing a unique analytical framework for each.' 8 ' The
Restatement (Third) substantially revises this section, consolidating
affirmative duties into a single provision, the proposed § 41. Titled "Duty
to Third Persons Based on Special Relationship With Person Posing
Risks," § 41 provides:
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes a duty
of reasonable care to third persons with regard to risks posed by the
other that arise within the scope of the relationship.
(b) Special relationships giving rise in the duty provided in
subsection (a) include:
(1) a parent with dependent children,
(2) a custodian with those in its custody,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. i
178.
(2010) (stating that when no reasonable jury could find negligence, "courts take the question away from
the jury and determine that the party was or was not negligent as a matter of law"); Broadbent v.
Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995) (noting that "trial courts should feel free to dismiss frivolous
cases on the ground that the parent has acted as a reasonable and prudent parent in a similar situation
would").
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmts.
179.
c-g (2010). As an example of a suit that might raise public policy concerns, imagine a suit alleging that
parents' failure to apply sunblock to the plaintiff when she was young, and her consequent severe
sunburns caused her early and aggressive skin cancer.
See Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272
180.
(1949) for a detailed description of other tort areas in which an affirmative duty has been imposed.
181.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ § 314-320

(1979).
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(3) an employer with employees when the employment
facilitates the employee's causing harm to third parties, and
(4) a mental-health professional with patients.1 82
The proposed provision is consistent with the Restatement (Third)'s
overarching goal of clarifying and simplifying the law of negligence, and
of making the duty of reasonable care "a more explicit norm."l 83 Section
316 of the prior Restatements was verbally and analytically awkward,
leading many courts to apply the shorthand "dangerous propensity"
standard.184 In contrast, § 41 is straightforward and familiar. Under the
Restatement (Third), the standard for affirmative duties mirrors the normal
duty standard: reasonableness under the circumstances. Section 41 is also
consistent with the Restatement (Third)'s controversial "purge" of
foreseeability from duty. 8 5
Eliminating foreseeability would represent a substantial shift in the
framework of negligent supervision liability. Foreseeability is essential to
the determination of parental duty under § 316, pursuant to which duty
exists only when a parent "knows or has reason to know that he has the
ability to control his child," and that the parent "knows or should know of
the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."' 86 The same
thing is true for courts that apply the simplified "dangerous propensity"
standard. In negligent supervision cases, foreseeability has become "duty's
'unified theory."" 87 Section 41 clears the foreseeability slate. Parents'
duty-reasonableness under the circumstances-is already established.
Courts should only engage in foreseeability analysis in the narrow slice of
cases where they find that no reasonable jury could find breach or
proximate cause.188 Juries, rather than judges, should become arbiters of
reasonable parental supervision under § 41.
There are difficult cases where a jury's allocation of parental
responsibility would contravene important public policies-for example, as
discussed below, courts should be cautious about allowing liability based

182.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM

§ 41

(Proposed Final Draft

No. 1, 2005). The duty of mental-health professionals to their patients is new to this Restatement,
reflecting changes in the law since Tarasoffv. Regents ofUniv. ofCal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
183.
Ellen Bublick, ComparativeFaultto the Limits, 56 VAND. L. REV. 977, 985 (2003).
See Crisafulli v. Bass, 38 P.3d 842, 847 (Mont. 2001) (Rice, J., concurring in part and
184.
dissenting in part) (resisting adoption of § 316 in part because the provision is "indiscernible").
See Cardi, supra note 161, at 739.
185.
186.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316(a)-(b) (1965).
187.
Cardi, supra note 170, at 922 (quoting BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 424
(1999)).
188.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 41 cmt. c (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005); id. reporters' note, cmt. d ("There must be a reasonably foreseeable risk of
harm before parents can be found negligent in failing to control their child.").

2013]

Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent

571

on a failure of a parent to medicate her child or based on a parent's failure
to broadly warn others about a child's sexual propensities.1 89 Under § 41
and § 7, however, courts must consider these questions directly, in terms of
public policy, rather than squeezing them into a case-specific
foreseeability/duty analysis.
For example, in Gritzner v. MichaelR., a four-year-old and her parents
brought suit against the mother of a ten-year-old boy and the mother's
boyfriend alleging that the boy molested the girl while she was playing at
his home under the boyfriend's supervision.' 90 The defendants knew that
the boy had the propensity to sexually molest other children. Despite this,
the court ruled that public policy prevented the imposition of a legal duty
on the boyfriend to warn the girl's parents of the danger because:
[t]he practical effect would be to require any adult who cared for a
child who had previously engaged in any conduct that could be
characterized as an "inappropriate sexual act" to stigmatize this
child in all of his or her relations with other children. We are
greatly hesitant to impose such a limitless duty to warn.' 9 '
In contrast to this difficult case, § 41 should render many negligent
supervision cases relatively straightforward. In particular, as the draft
commentary indicates, parental duty to supervise is at its zenith when
children are young.192 Negligent supervision in this context tends to be
immediate and physical because the child is with the parent or another
responsible adult. Moreover, parents should expect unpredictable changes
in behavior in young children. Therefore, duty limitations should not
prevent juries from evaluating parental conduct in cases alleging that a
young child started a fire, or climbed into a parked truck and pulled the
parking break, or knocked someone over with an overstuffed Costco
shopping cart, or climbed on an idling snowmobile.193 In some of these
See Part IVF at 585.
189.
See Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. 2000) (rejecting claim of failure to warn
190.
in case arising from child's sexual assault on public policy grounds, but sustaining a cause of action for
negligent supervision).
Id. at 916.
191.
192.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM

§ 41

cmt. d (Proposed Final

Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating that "courts recognize that the process of gaining independence is an
important consideration in determining what constitutes ordinary care"); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: [IAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM

§

10 cmt. d (2010) (stating that in

cases alleging misconduct by children under the age of five, questions of responsibility should focus on
the conduct of parents or other adults, but noting that once children enter school parental control
diminishes).
See Fuller v. Studer, 833 P.2d 109, 114 n.3 (Idaho 1992) (snowmobile); Jackson v.
193.
Wimbley, 463 S.E.2d 48, 48-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (no liability for four-year-old starting fire without
known proclivity of child to play with fire); Nat'l Dairy Products Corp. v. Freschi, 393 S.W.2d 48, 57
(Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (three-year-old lacked dangerous propensity to get in trucks and pull parking
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situations, a jury may find no liability on the ground that the parent acted
reasonably, but the court should not presage such a determination in the
form of a legal duty analysis.
Jury resolution is also important because courts sometimes evaluate
parental liability based on the parents'-inevitably biased-view of their
children's behavioral propensities. Under the § 316 standard, some courts
incorrectly focus solely on the foreseeability of misconduct by the parents'
child based on the child's typical at-home behavior.' 94 But questions of
negligent supervision become more complex and fact-intensive when
children are gathered in groups. 95 Parents who are supervising children in
such situations must be prepared to react to a wider range of potential
misconduct, particularly when they do not know all of the children
individually-and it is also reasonable to expect that children will act
differently among their peers than they do at home.
Section 41 is simple and reasonable-and a bit intimidating because it
will expand the circumstances under which suits against parents might
reach a jury. Nevertheless, courts should adopt it. The current law of
negligent supervision epitomizes the duty concerns the drafters of the
Restatement (Third) seek to ameliorate. The Restatement (Third)'s
approach should lead to clearer, fairer adjudication of negligent supervision
disputes. It will also encourage courts to confront directly some of the
important public policy questions that currently run silently through
judicial duty analyses in suits against parents arising out of harms caused
by their children to third parties.
IV. HOLDING PARENTS TO A STANDARD OF REASONABLE CARE

Holding parents to a consistent standard of reasonable care with respect
to their children would alleviate the policy and the doctrinal harms of the
current approach to both forms of parental liability: parent's liability to
their own children, and their liability to third parties for their children's
misconduct. As a matter of family law policy, the current common law
standards applied to parents represent clashing views of childhood and the
role of parents: In parent-child suits, parents are protected based on
idealized visions of parental authority, yet when parents are subject to

brakes); Paulson v. Huang, No. 60027-3-1, 2008 WL 3824773, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2008)
(no proof of dangerous proclivity of seven-year-old to negligently handle shopping carts).
194.
See, e.g., Kitchens v. Harris, 701 S.E.2d 207, 209 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Manuel v. Koonce,
425 S.E.2d 921, 922-23 (Ga. App. 1992) (party with alcohol not foreseeable when parents allowed
unsupervised slumber party of sixteen-year-old boys while away for the weekend).
195.
See Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REv. 1055, 1111-13
(discussing developmental science research explaining heightened susceptibility of adolescents to peer
influence).
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lawsuits for failing to exercise that authority, courts preserve parents out of
a sense that they have no real control over their offspring.
Furthermore, current standards are inconsistent with prevailing legal
norms related to the regulation of families. The standard of reasonable care,
which does not demand perfection, strikes a familiar and proper balance
between the benefits and burdens of parenthood. As a matter of tort
doctrine, imposing a standard of reasonable care on parents would
contribute toward greater consistency and equity in negligence law by
alleviating the problems associated with judges using duty to advance
unarticulated or unjustified policy goals. Nevertheless, many of the original
justifications for parental immunity remain entrenched in modem case law.
In essence, these justifications are based on valid fears about granting
juries, judges, or anyone, the power to evaluate parents. While recognizing
the legitimacy of these concerns, this Part addresses each and concludes
that, taken either collectively or individually, they do not justify existing
limitations on parental liability.
A. Fearof a "HelicopterParent" Standardof Care
According to cultural commentators and recent scholarship, many
middle- and upper-class parents with one or two children have become
suffocating scaremongers whose personal identities are largely dependent
on ensuring the minute-by-minute safety and optimal educational
development of their children.' 96 Scholars argue that this mainstream,
middle-class, predominantly white value system will permeate (or has
permeated) legal norms, thus forcing all families to conform to risk-averse,
expensive, and time-consuming supervision of children in order to escape
criminal or civil sanction.197 Related to this is a measured but distinct
idealization of "the old days," generally meaning the 1970s, when parents
"may" have allowed "the youngest of schoolchildren" the independence to
"climb trees, ride [their] bike[s] in the neighborhood, stay home alone for
an hour or two, and walk [themselves] to school." 98 Scholars have argued
that the narrowing of the parental immunity doctrine "is an important

196.
See Bernstein & Triger, supra note 5, at 1266 (describing overparenting as a "culture, race,
ethnicity, and class specific practice of parenting").
197.

See LISA ARONSON FONTES, CHILD ABUSE AND CULTURE: WORKING WITH DIVERSE

FAMILIES 63 (2005) (explaining that "cultural norms shape how we evaluate abuse and risk").
See Pimentel, supra note 5, at 979; see also Ilya Somin, When OrdinaryParentingPractices
198.
Can Land You in Court, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 18, 2012, 5:39 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/02/18/when-ordinary-parenting-practices-can-land-you-in-court/
(criticizing "growing legal and social bias" against young babysitters and corresponding increase in
babysitting costs).
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enabling structure for the incorporation of the practices of Intensive
Parenting." 99
Unquestionably, social norms concerning children and acceptance of
risk change over time. In colonial America, children were left largely
unattended while parents labored and were fostered out as apprentices at
ages as young as seven. 2 00 One result of this was likely early self-reliance,
but it was also rather common for children to come to serious physical
harm. In the nineteenth century, some children worked both on farms and
in urban factories. 2 0 ' However, hovering parents are hardly a new
phenomenon. Even in the nineteenth century, child-centered, intensive
parenting was becoming the middle-class norm in both urban and
agricultural areas. Mothers were charged with providing constant and
appropriately educational stimulation for children, as well as creating "an
idyllic childhood rich with wonderful experiences that would create fond
memories and produce healthy minds and bodies."202 Voluminous advice
literature assisted women in these endeavors.20 3 And these parental efforts
were not limited to the very young: Douglas Macarthur's mother
accompanied him to West Point in 1899, staying at a nearby hotel "where
for four years she could see the lamp in her son's window and tell whether
he was doing his homework." 204 There were helicopter mothers long before
there were helicopters.
Moreover, even the most vehement anti-helicopter parents (themselves
generally members of the middle-class parenting culture they criticize)
subscribe to increased safety norms over time. As Lenore Skenazy, leader
of the "Free Range Kids" movement, puts it, Free Rangers "believe in
safety . . . helmets, car seats, safety belts." 205 And, statistically speaking,

199.

Bernstein & Triger, supra note 5, at 1251.

200.
See Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 375, 396-99 (1996)
(describing colonial practice of apprenticing children).
201.
See Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 8, at 852-53 (describing federal and state
laws allowing parents to approve children's farm labor for less than minimum wage at ages as young as
twelve).
202.
See JAMES M. VOLO & DOROTHY DENNEEN VOLO, FAMILY LIFE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA 203 (2007).

203.
204.

See id. at 202.
Gerald Clarke, Glorious Commander, TIME, Sept. 11, 1978, at 89 (reviewing WILLIAM

MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR: DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, 1880-1964 (1978)).

205.

FREE RANGE KIDS FAQ PAGE, http://freerangekids.com/faq/ (last visited January 9, 2013);

see also Bridget Kevane, Guilty as Charged, BRAIN, CHILD: THE MAGAZINE FOR THINKING MOTHERS,

Summer 2009, available at http://www.brainchildmag.com/essays/summer2009 kevane.asp (describing
in detail decision to drop children off at the mall with a cell phone, strict instructions, and with
children's father five minutes away).
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such safety norms have dramatically improved safety outcomes for
children.2 06
The fact that norms evolve, and that middle-class parents have led the
way by minimizing risks and maximizing educational opportunities, does
not alone justify granting parents immunity from liability. Indeed, it is
ironic to argue that parents must be sheltered from other parents who
believe too firmly in over-sheltering. The same acts and omissions involved
in parenting cases-drowning accidents, children getting hit by cars, drunkdriving deaths, children falling out of windows or shopping carts-are
routinely litigated against other supervisory figures including schools,
colleges, daycares, babysitting agencies, product manufacturers, and
businesses. Those other parties cannot raise the "helicopter parent" defense.
The effect of limitations on parental liability is to give children's primary
caretakers-those who get the benefit and services of children-the lowest
standard of care.
The impact on others of shielding parents from liability is starkly
evident in joint liability cases, discussed above. When a child is injured and
brings suit against a product manufacturer-for example, the maker of a
tractor mower, of a shopping cart, or of lead paint-it is nonsensical to
prohibit a jury from assigning some portion of responsibility to the parent
who was allegedly supervising the child. Yet courts often bar contribution
suits against parents, although those parents' negligent supervision might
arguably have been the primary cause of the child's injury. In several New
York cases involving children's alleged injury from lead paint, courts
simply brushed aside parental immunity and allowed the claims. 2 07
Bernstein and Triger, concerned about over-parenting, take this as an
ominous sign that "courts are increasingly willing to consider imposing
liability on parents who do not comply with existing monitoring norms." 208
But if a parent is aware of a risk to her child and has been informed about
how to mitigate and eliminate that risk, but negligently fails to take action,
it is fair that the parent should bear part of the legal responsibility for the
harm she caused. Parents, like other parties, should conform to norms of
reasonableness.20 9
206.

These raised safety norms have dramatically reduced the chances of child injury and death.

See BRYAN CAPLAN, SELFISH REASONS TO HAVE MORE KIDS 96 (2011) (stating that accidental death

rates for children of all ages have sharply declined and children under age fifteen are four times safer
than they were in the 1950s).
207.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 697 N.Y.S.2d 486, 491-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)
(holding that negligent parental supervision is only "generally" not actionable and making an exception
in case where child alleged lead paint injuries).
208.
Bernstein & Triger, supra note 5, at 1256.
209.
Increasingly, children who commit crimes are not granted the liberal protection of a liability
carve-out based on their youth, but are held to established, if modified, cultural norms. See Maureen
O'Hagan, FatherSays Son Who Took Gun to School "Made a Bad Mistake," SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 23,
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The early application of immunity in a lawsuit also poses risks:
Courts-themselves prey to the cultural biases of judges-may not be
consistently reasonable in their determination that the immunity should
apply. In Zellmer v. Zellmer, the defendant-stepfather was granted
immunity (conditioned on a factual finding that he was acting in loco
parentis) for the drowning death of a three-year-old.210 The court's holding
necessarily implied that the defendant's conduct constituted "ordinary
negligence," as to which immunity applied. 2 11 But even at the summary
judgment stage, there was evidence that pointed to willful misconduct,
including testimony that the girl would not have gone outside on a cold
December night alone, dressed only in a light shirt, when she was home
sick from daycare; and evidence that the defendant had taken out a life
insurance policy on the girl immediately upon marrying her mother three
months earlier.2 12 Ultimately the defendant was criminally prosecuted and
convicted of murdering the three-year-old girl.2 13 The civil court's
immunity determination not only usurped the jury's province to assess the
quality of a defendant's conduct; it was also incorrect.
Fears of over-judgmental, culturally prejudiced juries are
understandable, but do not justify a common law carve-out for parents in
tort. Courts can address concerns about the standard of care in the context
of individual suits, using basic tools of the trade: admitting expert and lay
testimony on the standard of reasonable care within a community, giving
jury instructions making explicit that parents are not insurers of or for their
children, and defining a reasonable standard of care. Several states that
have abolished parental immunity have replaced it with a "reasonable
parent" standard, a semantic device that reinforces the nature of parents'
roles.2 14 As they always have, courts may direct verdicts if no reasonable
juror could find liability, and may use remittitur or remand for a new trial if
the jury's damages award is excessive or seems based on prejudice or
passion. Notably, there has been no scholarly analysis in states that have
abolished parental immunity arguing that ensuing cases were unduly
prejudicial toward parents or held parents up to an idealized standard of
care.

2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2017582563_bremerton24m.html
(discussing three
criminal charges and overnight juvenile imprisonment of nine-year-old who brought a gun to school
that critically injured a classmate when it discharged in his backpack).
210.
Zellmer v. Zellmer, 188 P.3d 497, 507 (Wash. 2008).
211.
Id. at 507.
212.
Id. at 499-500.
213.
See Sullivan, supra note 70.
214.
See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914 (1971) (adopting "reasonable parent" standard in
parent-child negligence suits); Comment, The Reasonable Parent Standard: An Alternative to ParentChild Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795 (1977).
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B. Fearthat Civil ParentalLiability Sanctions Undue
State Interference in the Family
A related concern animating limits on parental liability is the fear of
undue government interference in the family, or-as one court put it"interject[ing] the court into family affairs as some overarching nanny." 2 15
Here too, while the fear is legitimate, allowing juries to adjudicate civil tort
suits against parents is a relatively minimal intrusion into family life in
comparison with other longstanding forms of family regulation: Both social
and legal norms have always recognized limits on parental authority that go
far beyond allowing parents to be defendants in civil tort suits.216 The
Supreme Court has recognized the significance of parents' rights to make
decisions regarding their children's upbringing, education, and religious
practices.2 17 But the constitutional recognition of family privacy has always
been limited by reasonable governmental regulation, including laws
requiring education, prohibiting child labor, and governing custody
disputes. 2 18 Notwithstanding its rhetoric, the Court's holdings regarding
parental rights have always been rather muted and pragmatic. As the Court
stated in Meyer v. Nebraska, "the state may do much, go very far, indeed,
in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and
morally." 219
Parental immunity took root at the turn of the twentieth century, a time
period marked by an explosion of interest in privacy and the founding of
formal studies of child development. 22 0 It was also marked by an equally
intense interest in child welfare, backed up by a range of legal procedures
that demolished the privacy of families considered to be deviant, which at
that time (as often is true now) meant families living in urban poverty. The
New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, founded in

215.
Jeudy v. Jeudy, No. 122624, 2002 WL 1011513, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2002).
216.
See Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1087, 1135 (2002) ("In
contemporary American society, we accept greater government intervention in spousal relationships as
well as in child rearing."); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, Responsibility, and Commitment to Children: The
New Language of Morality in Family Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REv. 1111, 1165-72 (1999) (describing
increasingly aggressive laws to reduce domestic violence and child abuse).
217.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
218.

See id.; Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (upholding right of parents to

send children to private school but stating that "[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the state
reasonably to regulate all schools"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972) (Amish parents
could home school children); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (plurality) (state
statute allowing judge to grant non-parents visitation rights unconstitutional as applied).
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
219.
See JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN OUT THE
220.
WAY THEY Do 7 (1998) ("As an academic specialty, the study of how immature humans develop into

adults had a rather late beginning-around 1890. The early developmentalists were interested in
children but didn't pay much attention to their parents.").
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1874, set out to "rescue" children living in slums from "the human brutes
who happened to possess the custody or control of them." 22 1
Propelled by the influential Society, New York passed laws authorizing
"intense scrutiny of family life, the frequent arrest and incarceration of
parents found wanting, and the systematic institutionalization of their
children." 22 2 By the end of 1884, fifty-six cruelty societies existed
nationwide.22 3 In 1903, Colorado became the first state to criminalize the
vague offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.224 Thus,
parents who were poor or otherwise considered socially deviant risked
having children forcibly taken away or risked criminal sanctions for their
children's poor behavior. At the same time, middle- and upper-class
parents were literally immune from civil liability for even obvious and
severe physical abuse.
As evidenced by parental immunity cases, the privacy-class divide
remains today. Wealth buys parents both physical privacy-their
disciplinary tactics and parenting mistakes are hidden within private
homes 2 25-and legal privacy. Just as nineteenth-century judges were "far
more likely to appreciate the benefits of the tort immunity rule (to
22 6
propertied husbands) than to register its costs (to battered wives),"
judges empathize with the supervisory challenges facing parents rather than
the un-redressed harms to children.227 In contrast, Hasday points out,
government programs intended to support poor families are "driven by
suspicion of parental judgment, and an eagerness to scrutinize parental
conduct and constrain parental behavior." 228 Moreover, legislatures have
passed a wide range of statutes intended to incentivize parents to assume
responsibility and punish those who do not. These statutes, which impose
civil or criminal sanctions on parents for children's willful and malicious
221.
222.
223.
224.

Protectionfor Children, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1874.
See Hasday, ParenthoodDivided,supra note 7, at 306.
Id. at 342.
See Arnold Binder & Gilbert Geis, Sins of Their Children: Parental Responsibility for

Juvenile Delinquency, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 303, 305 (1991). As of 1991, forty-

two states and the District of Columbia retained statutes criminalizing the offense of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. See id.
Homeless parents, or parents without childcare who must bring their children with them
225.
everywhere, are naturally subject to much more frequent critical scrutiny. Marie Ashe and Naomi Cahn
give an example of a woman who waited hours with her children at a District of Columbia courthouse
to seek a protective order against her husband. Late in the day, her children were misbehaving, and she
took off her shoe and threatened them with it. Her lawyer subsequently reported her to local child abuse
authorities. See Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problemfor Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 75, 97-99 (1993).
Siegel, supranote 10, at 2180-81.
226.
Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338, 343 (N.Y. 1974) (finding no duty for negligent
227.
supervision because "it would be the rare parent who could not conceivably be called to account in the
courts for his conduct toward his child").
Hasday, ParenthoodDivided, supra note 7, at 369.
228.
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acts, vandalism, truancy, and for contributing to children's delinquency,
indicate that parental responsibility-and liability-is a social norm.229
Unfortunately, many of those limits fall disproportionately on poorer
families.230 Similarly, poor and fragmented families are vastly more likely
to have their children removed and placed in the foster care system-a
modem, more humane version of the institutions supported by the child
cruelty societies--or their parental rights terminated. 23 1 And among parents
who do neglect their children, working-class or unemployed parents are far
more likely to be prosecuted than middle- or upper-class parents.232 Thus,
to the extent that there is a social norm of noninterference in the family, it
is not enforced uniformly or fairly. The parental immunity doctrine thus
illustrates the stark contrast between the broad privacy rights accorded
middle- and upper-class parents (those most likely to be defendants in civil
lawsuits) and the long tradition of interference in families that are poor or
otherwise deviate from prevailing social norms. In this context, privacy is
"a virtual commodity purchased by the middle class and the well-to-do." 23 3
Indeed, the common law of parental liability itself demonstrates the
increasing acceptance of state regulation of families. At first the immunity
covered all parental conduct, and paralleled an immunity that applied
between spouses. Now inter-spousal immunity has been almost entirely
abolished and there are significant limitations on parental immunity. In
addition, the common law recognizes that parents owe an affirmative duty
to control their children from harming others. 23 4

229.
See Gentile, supra note 2, at 128 (listing parental liability statutes and observing that every
state except New Hampshire has one). Two states-Hawaii and Louisiana-enacted statutes holding
parents strictly liable for children's torts. Id. at 129.
230.
See generally Hasday, Parenthood Divided, supra note 7 (describing state and private
policing of poor parents); Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel, PunishingFamily Status,
88 B.U. L. Rev. 1327, 1341-43 (2008) (critiquing criminal laws based on family status, including
parental liability laws); Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Liability Laws: Sending
Messages, But What Kind and to Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 6-7 (2006) (criticizing parental
responsibility ordinances on the ground that they are rarely enforced and their expressive function
encourages overly aggressive policing of teens); Sandra Guerra, Family Values?: The Family as an
Innocent Victim of Civil Drug Asset Forfeiture, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1996) (describing civil
forfeiture of homes where parents did not take sufficient steps to prevent children's drug dealing); S.
Randall Humm, Criminalizing Poor ParentingSkills as a Means to Contain Violence by and Against
Children, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1123 (1991) (addressing constitutional concerns with imposing criminal
liability on parents for children's misconduct); Elena R. Laskin, How Parental Liability Statutes
Criminalize and Stigmatize Minority Mothers, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1195 (2000).
231.
See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 (2006).
232.
See Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting
Negligent Parents,100 NW. U. L. REv. 807, 809 (2006).
233.
Allen, supranote 83, at 197.
234.

See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 316

(1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

(1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM
1,2005).

§41

§ 316

(Proposed Final Draft No.
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C. Belief that CriminalLaw Is Sufficient to Protect
Children and Third Parties
From the first cases, courts have justified parental immunity on the
ground that criminal law or child welfare services are sufficient to remedy
any problems that children might suffer. Implicit in this view are the
assumptions that negligent or abusive conduct toward children is deviant
and unusual, and that the criminal law or state social services can and will
intervene in those few cases where it would be necessary to punish the
parent or remove the child from parental custody. This view categorizes
tort law as an unnecessary luxury for children, just as nineteenth-century
courts considered tort suits by women as an unnecessary way to address
"trivial family disagreements." 235 But criminal law, like tort law, favors
wealthier parents.236 Because their neighborhoods are not targeted for
social support, they are not subject to the accompanying scrutiny of their
family arrangements, and their large houses afford more privacy from
neighbors. Were it not for the irrefutable video footage of Judge Adams
beating his daughter, what are the chances that he would have been held
accountable? 237 Moreover, just as feminist scholars do not see divorce or
criminal prosecution of wife beaters as a viable replacement for civil tort
relief, the presence of other criminal and family law vehicles for addressing
violence to children does not render the benefits of civil damages suits
obsolete. Indeed, options for neglected children are even bleaker than those
for women: Short of emancipation or foster care, children are physically
and functionally unable to leave their families.
The same logic applies with greater force in negligent supervision
actions against parents. Where an unsupervised teen holds a party that
results in a drunk-driving death, the family of the person who has died
would not be made whole in the (unlikely) event that the teen, his drunkdriving friend, or the absent parents were criminally sanctioned. Finally,

235.
See Siegel, supra note 10, at 2166 (quoting Drake v. Drake, 177 N.W. 624, 625 (Minn.
1920)).
236.
See Collins, supra note 232, at 848 (noting distinctions based on class in likelihood of
criminal prosecution of parents for the death of their children); Siegel, supra note 10, at 2162-63
(observing that "it was married men of the middle and upper classes who might face tort claims for wife
beating-precisely those men who were unlikely to face criminal prosecution for wife beating during
the ... nineteenth century"). See also Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 910 (N.H. 1930) ("To the claim
that [criminal proceedings] give [a child] sufficient remedy, it may be shortly answered that it would
not be so considered as to any other wrong or a wrong to any other individual, or a wrong to this one
done by any other party.").
237.
The judge continues to maintain his innocence of wrongdoing: "In my mind I have not done
anything wrong other than discipline my child when she was caught [illegally downloading content
from the Internet]." Hillary Adams, Daughter Allegedly Beaten By Judge, Asks People to Help Her
Father, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/02/hillary-adamsjudge-beats daughter n_1072350.html. State and federal prosecutors have declined to press charges. Id.
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state criminal abuse and neglect statutes that give power to local police,
child welfare services officials, and prosecutors are subject to greater
potential for over-enforcement based on a range of political or personal
motivations.23 8 At the very least, such actors are no more immune to public
cultural pressure than jurors in civil suits. Granting increased criminal
enforcement power to state officials might shield the wealthy parents who
are very rarely selected for prosecution under such statutes, but it is a blunt
and harsh instrument for regulating parental conduct.
D. Fearof Collusion andRising Insurance Costs
Beginning with Hewellette v. George in 1891, courts justified both
parental immunity and inter-spousal immunity based on a threat of
collusion between family members at the "tactical[] disadvantage[] [of]
insurance companies." 239 The shadow of collusion was given substance by
the rather unusual procedural postures of some cases. In a case alleging
injury by a parent who had died, the surviving parent might wear multiple
hats, as a representative of the child plaintiff, as a plaintiff himself (for loss
of services), and-representing the estate-as a defendant. 24 0 Up through
the 1960s, this argument, vigorously made by insurance companies, upheld
parental immunity in all contexts, particularly including the most common,
which were car accidents.
Automobile guest statutes, which created a statutory immunity from
claims against drivers by passengers, including but not limited to family
members, were motivated by nearly identical concerns of collusion, rising
insurance costs, and runaway litigation. 24 1 The courts also pointed to moral
considerations, including the "injustice of permitting an ungrateful guest to
repay his host with a lawsuit and the desirability of encouraging aid to
238.
See Pimentel, supra note 5, at 980 (describing prosecutor's justification for child neglect of
university professor for leaving her children, the oldest of whom was twelve, unattended at the mall, as
a belief that people with "major educations" should not get special treatment).
239.
Varholla v. Varholla, 383 N.E.2d 888, 889 (Ohio 1978), overruled by Shearer v. Shearer, 18
Ohio St. 3d 94 (1985); Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 886 (1891) (listing collusion among other
concerns), abrogatedby Glaskox ex rel Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
See, e.g., Karam v. Allstate Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1014, 1018-19 (Ohio 1982), overruled by
240.
Dorsey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 457 N.E.2d 1169 (Ohio 1984) ("[w]e cannot logically accept
as meritorious the collusion argument to support a doctrine of interspousal immunity and yet find the
same argument insubstantial in child-parent litigation.").
241.
See Chas. Caflin Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle Automobile Indemnity Companies?, 61 AM.
L. REV. 77 (1927); Cases Noted, Applicability ofAutomobile Guest Statutes to Minors, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 543, 544 (1952) (listing justifications for guest statutes); see, e.g., Howland v. Ryan, 172 F.2d
784, 785 (8th Cir. 1949) (upholding constitutionality of automobile guest statute that denied recovery to
guests "related by blood or marriage within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity to [the] owner
or operator" of the vehicle, even in situations where the driver's misconduct was willful or wanton, on
the ground that such family members assumed the risk by accepting gratuitous rides and to prevent
fraud and collusion).
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travelers in distress."24 2 However, when a driver's negligence injured a
paying passenger in an automobile "not only did courts impose liability,
but they frequently imposed a higher standard of care." 243 The result was an
immense difference in the standard of care applied to the same driver
depending on her relationship with her passenger. In a related context,
charities such as hospitals and churches were also granted "no-duty"
immunity when they were acting on charitable impulses, presumably based
on the belief that it would be ungrateful to repay charity with a lawsuit.244
Notwithstanding the prevalence of all of these limitations on duty
and/or liability through many decades of the twentieth century, courts have
largely relinquished the pattern of granting certain defendants a lower
standard of care based on policy perceptions related to fraud and collusion.
Automobile guest statutes have been abolished or severely restricted, and
the charitable and inter-spousal immunity doctrines have fallen into
disrepute.245 Moreover, most states relinquished parental immunity in the
context of car accidents-the most common form of such suits-precisely
on the ground that the suits were primarily aimed at the insurance
companies, not at the parents. Finally, courts have acknowledged that they
possess independent tools in aid of their jurisdiction that can prohibit
collusion in individual cases. Thus, courts have forthrightly abandoned the
"collusion" justification for parental immunity.246
Notably, however, insurance companies have adopted other
mechanisms for limiting coverage among family members. For example,
limitations on coverage for intentional acts will prevent third parties from
obtaining insurance proceeds from parents whose child commits an
intentional tort. If parents are held liable for negligently supervising their
child, however, insurance will generally cover liability for that independent
negligence. Nonetheless, in the immunity context, insurance policies
frequently bar coverage for injury to a fellow family member, including in
automobile accident cases, and courts have often upheld such coverage
restrictions. 2 47 In the context of inter-spousal tort immunity, one scholar has
242.
Cases Noted, supra note 241, at 544.
243.
Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Actingfor Economic Gain as a Suspect Motive,
41 VAND. L. REV. 63, 86 (1988).
244.
See id. at 67-73.
245.
See Charles Robert Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 401, 401 (1991) (noting that "almost all states have either abandoned or substantially
constricted the doctrine" of charitable immunity).
246.
See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967); Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648 (Cal.
1971); Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1981); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979);
France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 267 A.2d 490 (N.J. 1970); Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich.
1972); Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 869 (N.M. 1981).
247.
See, e.g., Vierkant ex rel Johnson v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996) ("household exclusion [which, for example, might exclude coverage for bodily injury to insured
and residents of household] prominently placed within a homeowner's insurance contract does not
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denoted such insurance restrictions a "de facto . .. immunity." 24 8 The
public policy behind such insurance clauses is questionable, but that
question cannot be debated until there exists a possibility of an initial
lawsuit.
E. FearofImposing Liability on Parentsof Troubled Children
This Article argues that, in general, parents should be treated just as all
other tortfeasors in civil suits. Nevertheless, as discussed above in Part II.B,
parents may be subject to lawsuits on the basis of tortious or criminal
actions by their behaviorally troubled children-children whose problems
are beyond the ability of any reasonable parent to control. How does
"reasonable" parental supervision take into account the practical reality that
some children are far more difficult to parent than others? A prison or a
school for troubled youth anticipates and presumably obtains payment for
the additional costs it incurs related to supervising its charges. And
employers can often reduce their liability by firing employees. But to some
degree, parents simply get what they get in terms of children. 249
In many cases, a reasonableness standard will require added burdens on
the part of parents with higher-need children. For example, children with
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) might have impulse
control issues that make them more likely to dash across a street without
looking for oncoming traffic. Parents of such children must exercise more
care than parents of more docile offspring. As children age, a parent might
have a duty to prevent a troubled child from gaining access to weapons, or
a car, or from staying home unsupervised for the weekend. Under current
restrictions on negligent supervision claims, parents have no duty to
prevent a child's misconduct unless they have clear notice of precisely the
type of misconduct at issue. Juries, however, are unlikely to restrain
themselves in such an artificial manner: If a child has been shooting at

create an unconscionable contract of adhesion"); see generally Martin J. McMahon, Annotation,
Validity, Under InsuranceStatutes, ofCoverage Exclusion for Injury to or Death oflnsured's Family or
HouseholdMembers, 52 A.L.R. 4th 18 (1987).
See Jennifer Wriggins, Interspousal Tort Immunity and Insurance "Family Member
248.
Exclusions": Shared Assumptions, Relational and Liberal Feminist Challenges, 17 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J.
251 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (critiquing insurance limitations from feminist perspective but not
addressing impact on children).
See Crisafulli v. Bass, 38 P.3d 842, 847 (Rice, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
249.
("From my observation of many others, and from my own endeavors, including 19 years of trying every
approach to child rearing from Spock's loving flexibility to Dobson's loving discipline, I am convinced
that controlling one's child is a notion far too elusive to support the imposition of parental liability.
Even parents who actively and responsibly supervise their children can find it difficult, if not
impossible, to control their children.").
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people with a BB gun, the jury might well find that parents should have
closely monitored his access to that or any other form of firearm.250
Courts appear justifiably concerned about the broader impact of
imposing civil liability on parents of seriously troubled teens. Society
greatly benefits when parents provide housing, support, and medical care to
troubled children, even when it is sometimes an incredibly difficult and
occasionally thankless task. Imposing liability on parents who fail to
exercise reasonable care in such circumstances might reduce families'
incentive to allow a troubled child to continue to live, un-emancipated, at
home.25 1 Imposition of such liability is even more troubling when parents
continue to provide housing and care for troubled adult children.2 52
Moreover, it is plausible that juries-if given the opportunity-might find
that parents' supervisory duty requires that they obtain medication for their
child's mental illness or behavioral disorder. In Neiuwendorp v. American
Family Insurance Co., the court was careful to state that the parents had
violated a duty to warn the school that it had stopped the child's ADHD
medication (after which the child hurt his teacher), not a duty to give the
child medication in the first instance.2 53 However, that distinction could
collapse if medical evidence demonstrates that counseling or medicationwhether ADHD medication or anti-depressant medication-renders
otherwise volatile children safe to themselves and others.254
These questions are difficult. But they do not justify a blanket
constriction on parental duties. Not all negligent supervision cases involve
intractably ill teens. Moreover, judges are no better equipped than jurors to
evaluate these fact-dependent questions and to assess the reasonableness of
parents' responses to such problems. On balance, therefore, it seems
preferable to allow courts to address and juries to debate these issues in

250.
See Manuel v. Koonce, 425 S.E.2d 921 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
Almost every state has a so-called "safe haven" law that allows parents to abandon their
251.
infants at a designated location without legal recrimination. See generally Carol Sanger, Infant Safe
Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (2006). In 2008, Nebraska
passed a safe haven law that did not limit the age of the abandoned child; during the four-month
existence of the law, thirty-six children had been abandoned, twenty-seven of whom were older
children or teens. See Note, Diane K. Donnelly, Nebraska's Youth Need Help-But Was a Safe Haven
Law the Best Way?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 771, 776-77 (2010).
252.
Many states legally require parents to continue to provide support for a disabled child who
reaches adulthood if the onset of the disability precedes adulthood. See Sande L. Buhai, Parental
Support of Adult Children With Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. REV. 710, 723-25 (2007) (describing state
laws).
253.
See Nieuwendorp v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 529 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1995).
254.
See Praveen Madhiraju, Comment, RIP Ritalin in Proportion! The Eighth Circuit's
Restriction on a Parent's Right to Have Schools Accommodate the Needs of Their DisabledChildren:
Debord and Davis, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1661, 1664-68 (2001) (describing ADHD and ameliorative
effect of mediation).
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individual cases, rather than constricting duty as a blunt instrument to
eliminate liability.
F. Fearof a GeneralizedDuty to Warn

Closely related to the potential for creation of a common law duty to
medicate one's child is the troubling potential that courts, through juries,
might impose on parents a wide-ranging duty to warn third parties about
their child's negative behavioral propensities. As discussed above, there is
increasing pressure on courts (as well as on parents, schools, and othersupervisors of children) to warn others about potential behavioral problems
of certain children, particularly when such problems might involve sexual
misconduct or violence.255 But imposition of a broad duty to warn of a
child's sexual tendencies poses serious, potentially devastating, social risks
to the child. And juries may find such a duty in a wide array of situations
given the number of opportunities for children to be alone together at
school, during after-school activities, while visiting each other's houses or
during unstructured neighborhood play. The proliferation of productliability warnings and criminal sex-registry warnings is gradually seeping
into a more generalized legal duty to warn of specific and reasonably
foreseeable harms.256 As recent media coverage of a school stabbing
incident makes pellucid, parents-and communities in general-now
would like to be warned of potential dangers to their children, even when
such warnings would (1) do very little practical good; and (2) create
outcasts of even young children based on community fears of their
misconduct.2 57
As in Tarasoff,the public policy problems associated with imposing a
duty to warn in this context can be mitigated by requiring the danger to be
substantial and the potential victim of the danger to be easily identifiable.258
In the alternative, courts may refrain from imposing liability based on a
failure to warn of a child's behavioral propensities and instead allow a
See supra Part II.C; see also Doe v. Kahrs, 662 N.E.2d 101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (holding
255.
parents subject to liability for negligent supervision, although they were not home at the time, when
they were aware that one of their sons had previous history of inappropriate sexual misconduct).
See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (psychotherapists had
256.
duty to warn former girlfriend of patient's intent to harm her).
257.
See Nicole Brodeur, After School Kmife Attack, Law Seems Crazy, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 31,
2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/nicolebrodeur/2016659331 nicoleOlm.html (complaining that
federal privacy law wrongly prevented a high school of warning community that one of its students was
suffering serious mental illness: "Peanut allergy? Absolutely. Send a notice to everyone in the class.
Mental illness that could lead to threats or violence? No, no. That's something that school officials must
keep quiet.").
258.
See, e.g., Isbell v. Ryan, 983 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (finding mother could be
liable for failure to warn her ex-husband's wife that son might pose a danger to stepmother's daughter
based on history of son's sexual molestation of cousin).
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claim for negligent supervision of that child on the premise that parents
who do not wish to reveal potentially troubling traits in their children may
opt instead to keep a close eye on them in the presence of other children.2 59
Either of these approaches avoids the imposition of a generalized duty of
parents to warn of problems with their child, which has troubling
implications, while also recognizing the importance of parental oversight of
children with behavioral problems that pose serious risks to others who are
not in a position to protect themselves.
CONCLUSION

For over a century before the publication of the Restatement (Third),
courts have struggled to accommodate conflicting visions of what
constitutes a family, how relationships should be ordered within those
families, and how the law should conceive of children. Those struggles
have not been distinguished by their consistency or by their analytical
depth. 26 0 But two things have remained constant: Judges have exercised
their power to determine the contours of parental duty, even if their
aggression has taken the outward form of non-interference and they have
consistently shielded parents from exposure to liability through immunities
and privileges supported by a rotating array of justifications based on fear.
In many ways parental liability is based on the received wisdom of an
earlier age, when the law was rigidly protective of precise status
relationships within the family as the state defined it, and children were
considered to be little different than a form of parental property. As we
attempt to move beyond this property conception of childhood, the law's
respect for parental rights should be matched by an enforceable respect for
parental responsibility.
The reconsideration of our broad notions of duty in negligence,
associated with the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, is a perfect opportunity for
courts to reconsider these longstanding practices and hold parents to a
consistent standard of reasonable care with respect to their children. As
courts discovered when they abandoned inter-spousal immunity, the aura of
impenetrability that surrounds families may be dispelled with fundamental
common law tort principles. Moreover, holding parents to a standard of

259.
See, e.g., Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906, 912-18 (Wis. 2000) (recognizing
negligent supervision claim arising out of sexual assault on four-year-old plaintiff by ten-year-old
neighbor with history of sexually inappropriate conduct but denying claim for negligent failure to warn
on public policy grounds).
260.
See McCurdy, supra note 15, at 1030 ("Few topics in the law of persons and domestic
relations . . .display in their treatment greater inconsistency and more unsatisfactory reasoning, and
present a more characteristic development in judicial reaction.").
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reasonable care with respect to their children will not threaten the core
values of intimate relationships. Family members who initiate lawsuitsand not a court-should determine where family boundaries lie, and when
they should be breached. Common law courts should trust in negligence
law principles, and allow juries to judge parents.

